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The Urban Mass Transportation Administration announced in 1989 an initiative to encourage local transit 
agencies to provide a greater local share for capital projects. Known as overmatch, this greater local 
share was expected to result in greater local flexibility in transit planning and greater consideration in 
Federal review and decisions regarding capital project approvals. This research project provides a history 	. 
of this Overmatch Initiative. The report examines the transit finance literature and the economics/political 
science literature relating to greater local matching for capital projects. The research also examined the 
Section 15 data base to determine if this source of information could be used to reflect overmatch trends 
among transit agencies. 	A national survey of transit agencies was conducted to assess the transit 
industry's reaction to the Overmatch Initiative. 	Several case studies of local transit response to the 
Initiative were conducted and the results were used to assess the overall effectiveness of the new policy. 
The research concludes that several transit agencies were overmatching before the Initiative was 
announced mainly to avoid Federal regulations and time delays. Few transit agencies used financial 
models to identify long-term systems costs. Many transit officials concluded that the requirement for cash 
overmatch was extremely limiting. The research project recommends that UMTA shift the overmatch 
focus away from individual projects to regional, programmatic perspectives. UMTA should also take 
steps to require long-range, financial planning in project planning Importantly, the report recommends 
a (thane in the current Federal program matching requirements. It is recommended to lower Federal 
matching ratios to 50-50 (or 60-40) with additional funds made available to those communities that meet 
some special "need" criteria. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
One of the more recent Federal efforts at encouraging greater non-Federal participation in 
transit investment is known as the Overmatch Initiative. In this Initiative, the Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration (UMTA) proposed to provide expedited review of project 
documentation and, in some cases, allow the consideration of Federal funds for investments in 
more than one corridor, if the local share of the investment exceeds the minimum amount 
required by law. Another incentive was the possibility of improving a proposal's UMTA 
priority ranking in the decision-making process, thus influencing a project's likelihood of 
obtaining Federal funds. This research project assessed the transit agency response to this 
Initiative. 
The research consisted of four major tasks. The first task was to review existing data sets 
(such as Section 15) to determine the status of transit investment today. Contacts were also 
made with numerous governmental groups to identify other examples of overmatch programs. 
This task also undertook a literature search which examined the economics and political science 
literature for discussions of intergovernmental programs based on Federal-local matching. The 
second task was to prepare and conduct a national survey of transit agencies to identify the 
capital investment strategies currently under consideration, and the local response to the 
Overmatch Initiative. The third task was to evaluate the results of this survey, and the final task 
was to conduct more detailed case investigations in six cities--Atlanta, Baltimore, Denver, 
Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. The results of this research are presented in the 
following pages. 
RESPONSE TO OVERMATCH INITIATIVE 
The research team found that, in general, there was a mixed opinion on the usefulness and 
appropriateness of the Overmatch Initiative.  In particular, numerous transit officials expressed 
concern about the "fairness" issue, that is, giving those communities who can afford more local 
support an unfair advantage over those less able to do so. This concern was especially strong 
among those officials who thought that local share might be more important in UMTA's 
decisions than need or cost effectiveness. Several officials sugge5 -ed that overmatch might be 
an appropriate "tiebreaker" when transit needs have been satisfied and cost effectiveness 
determinations find that proposals are about even. Several agencies supported the Overmatch 
Initiative because they felt that it was a good way of stretching limited Federal dollars. 
The research project found several communities that had already begun overmatching. some 
at 100 percent local shares, even before the New Starts policy or the Overmatch Initiative had  
been announced. The major reason for this overmatch was to avoid what were considered to 
be excessive delays due to Federal process and oversight requirements. In Baltimore, for 
example, the Central Light Rail line is funded with 100 percent local funds, according to local 
officials to expedite its construction. In Los Angeles, several light rail lines are also funded 100 
percent locally so that they can be done "in this Century". It seems apparent, therefore, that 
several communities were already in the process of raising local funds to support transit capital 
investment. In the context of this phenomenon, there can be no definitive statement that the 
overmatch policy has had a significant impact on local transit financing decisions. 
In those cases where a local overmatch was provided, a surprisi , g number of proposals were 
initiated by private sector representatives.  Although the number of such cases was quite small, 
especially when considered in light of the small number of agencies bat responded to this survey 
question, the expectation was that almost all of the initiation would have been done by transit 
agencies. 
Very few transit agencies seem to be using_a long-term financial model to consider total  
systems cost in project proposals.  The uncertainties associated with the stability of revenue 
sources over time requires that a fairly sophisticated financial analysis should be conducted of 
an agency's ability to support its system and the new project in future years. In Los Angeles, 
for example, such a budget scenario analysis allowed officials to determine that several projects 
were not likely to be funded because existing local funding source were not going to provide 
sufficient revenues. In Houston, a budget scenario analysis provided good information to 
METRO officials about their cash flow given the construction of different transit proposals. 
Given that the overmatch policy encourages a greater local match, it becomes important that a 
greater emphasis be placed in the development of realistic financial scenarios. This is especially 
true if private sector funding is expected in support of a project, where that funding is predicated 
on assessments or some other mechanism that depends on market forces. 
An analysis of the Section 15 data base showed no indication that the New Starts overmatch 
criterion had any measurable impact on local financing of transit. This conclusion, although it 
supports the results from the rest of the research project, should be treated with some caution. 
In particular, it was somewhat difficult to identify private sources of funding in the Section 15 
data base. In addition, the year-to-year variation in revenue sources was rather substantial, 
leading one to suspect that the data might not be that reliable for the purposes of this research 
project. 
Only one region, the Bay Area, seemed to be approaching the Overmatch Initiative from a 
regional or programmatic perspective. The Bay Area transit overmatch strategy is based on an 
extensive, region-wide study of what transit capital improvements are needed in the future. 
Some of the facilities are to be funded with 100 percent local funds, and others are expected to 
have varying levels of Federal participation. Although somewhat unique in its approach, the 
systems perspective in transit capital planning seems to make a stronger case for Federal 
investment in a region, rather than in a specific facility. 
Several transit officials commented that the requirement for cash overmatch contributions  
was extremely limiting. Such a requirement was especially constraining when dealing with 
private sector contributions. The major means of such contributions in the past has been land 
donations and or leasing arrangements. Many transit officials stated that it is very difficult to 
convince private developers and businessmen to contribute funding for a particular project. As 
long as there is a cash requirement, private sector contributions will not likely play a major role 
in overmatch contributions. Outside of the private sector issue, numerous transit officials 
thought that "in-kind" services should be allowed as part of an overmatch given that it is a cost 
associated with a project. 
A large percentage of the survey respondents stated that they do not know how to initiate 
an overmatch request, or for that matter how to raise the additional funds at the local level. 
There was a fair amount of interest in the overmatch concept and how transit agencies could use 
it to raise additional local funds. This finding suggests that additional information on the 
U' 
Initiative and further researci on innovative local funding sources ould be well received by the 
industry. 
There was no perceived difference in the overmatch policy between the three UMTA 
program Tiers. Although a small number of transit officials did know the different overmatch 
concepts associated with each of the three UMTA program categories, the vast majority of the 
survey respondents did not know that the Overmatch Initiative applied to all three. Most all 
respondents thought the Initiative was soley aimed at new starts. 
There is no industry agreement on whether the Overmatch Initiative is a good or bad idea.  
Many survey respondents said that no UMTA decisions have been made on the basis of 
overmatch, so that it was too soon to determine the policy's appropriateness. Others were 
vehemently opposed to any policy that required a greater local match. And others felt that the 
concept was quite good. 
RECOMMENDED UMTA ACTIONS 
Perhaps the most important recommendation from this research l' ,..ject deals with future use 
of the overmatch concept in transit and other transportation programs. The scant literature that 
has addressed this type of intergovernmental program management seems fairly clear on the 
benefits (from a national perspective) of allowing local applicants to propose a greater local 
share for specific proposals. Not only does this allow Federal funds to be leveraged against 
more projects, it encourages communities to provide a closer representation of what they are 
willing to pay for a service. It also forces a consensus at the local level that this proposal is 
something the community should be doing. 
However, an overmatch concept is only likely to work if there are substantial incentives to 
encourage local officials to contribute additional funding. There does not seem to be any 
evidence that UMTA has been significantly influenced in its project decisions by the existence 
of overmatch. The Overmatch Initiative does allow greater flexibility in program management, 
but generally the survey respondents did not feel that overmatch has become an important 
consideration in UMTA decisions. One way of dealing with this is to change the focus of the 
Overmatch Initiative away from the individual project basis to the regional, programmatic  
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perspective. In many cases, one of the most controversial positions taken be UMTA has been 
the one-corridor-at-a-time approach to Federal funding. Although a systems planning component 
is incorporated into this approach, some argue that the resulting process severely limits an 
agency's ability to take a system's perspective in its planning for a community's transit future. 
The Bay Area strategy, which took a long time to develop and to secure local funding sources, 
seems to allow a systems perspective while at the same time developing an overall funding 
strategy for the region. It also forces the local agencies to adopt a long-range financial planning 
perspective in their formal planning efforts. Allowing communities to get away from a corridor-
by-corridor analysis might be a good incentive to local officials in seriously considering the 
Overmatch Initiative. 
UMTA should also take steps to require a long-range, financial planning process in  
connection with UMTA projects. This includes not only the UMTA project, but also the 
Undertaking and, in some cases, the entire financial capability of the agency. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that Federal funds will be spent contingent on the existence of an 
assessment of the local agency's ability to operate the facility and other services in the region. 
This requirement could be made procedural, or be provided through technical guidance. Case 
studies of successful financial forecasting (such as Los Angeles and Houston, in this research) 
could be used to develop an industry-wide approach to such forecasting. The Federal interest 
in making sure an investment will meet national needs goes beyond the narrowly defined project 
under consideration. 
There is a perception that the Overmatch Initiative is unfair to those communities that are 
unable to afford additional local funds, and thus, as many survey respondents stated, "the rich 
get richer". This equity issue is a serious one and needs to be dealt with. The overmatch  
criterion in UMTA evaluation is clearly an important one. but either it should receive less  
weight than other criteria (which it might have already). or applicants should be classified in  
some manner by their ability to pay. In the latter case, some index could be developed for each 
applicant community which examines economic growth, tax base, future population/employment 
figures, etc., and if it is determined that a community is in a strong growth or healthy climate, 
the overmatch criterion will be given greater consideration. Those communities that fit into the 
V 
other category would not have overmatch as a criterion in the funding decision. Another way 
of accomplishing the same goal is to lower the current Federal-local matching ratios from 80-20 
to 60-40 (or even 50-50) and then provide extra grant funds for those communities that can  
demonstrate need or for those communities that clearly meet somei - Iona' criterion (such as air 
quality improvement).  
Many respondents identified the cash requirement as unnr sarily stringent. This is 
apparently so especially in the case of encouraging private sect r contributions. A list of 
acceptable "in-kind" services or donations should be incorporat  into the Overmatch Policy. 
These in-kind donations should clearly relate to a reduction in Federal costs and not be services 
or facility construction that would have been provided by the locaT , ency. 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE 
It was clear from the survey results and from the case investigations that many transit 
officials did not know much about the Overmatch Initiative. Although several did have the 
"Dear Colleague" letter from the UMTA Administrator, most had expected to receive further 
information on what the Initiative consisted of, and what steps were necessary to participate in 
the program. In particular, several transit officials commented that the UMTA regional offices 
were not able to provide much further information that what was available in the letter. This 
lack of information, perhaps more than anything else, has probably beem an important reason 
for limited local response to the Initiative. If UMTA is serious about the Overmatch conc -- t, 
it seems clear that technical guidance should be issued, information disseminated on successful  
overmatch efforts, and clear indicat'7is given on how imp, - -tant overmatch is in the UMTA 
decision-making process. A policy which relies on incentives to encourage a change in local 
behavior needs to make clear what these incentives are. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL OVERMATCH INITIATIVE ON 
LOCAL TRANSIT DECISION-MAKING 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of urban mass transit finance in the United States is characterized by changing 
perspectives of, and varying roles for, the major actors involved in the provision of transit 
services. Perhaps the most important trend in such finance during the past decade has been the 
shift away from Federal support of transit investment to an increasing reliance on State and local 
resources. One of the more recent Federal efforts at encouraging this greater non-Federal 
participation in transit investment is known as the Overmatch Initiative. In this Initiative, the 
Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) proposes to provide expedited review of 
project documentation and, in some cases, allow the consideration of Federal funds for 
investments in more than one travel corridor, if the local share of the investment exceeds the 
minimum amount required by law. Another incentive, besides expedited project review and 
greater planning flexibility, is the possibility of improving a proposal's UMTA priority ranking 
and thus presumably influencing Federal decision-makers to favor such Overmatch projects. The 
Overmatch Initiative permits an examination of the local commitment to capital-intensive transit 
investment and the respective roles of State/local governments and the private sector. Besides 
being of some interest because of its possible impact on Federal-State-Local transit finance, the 
Overmatch Initiative also provides an interesting new perspective on the Federal role in all forms 
of transportation investment, and perhaps in other areas as well. 
The purpose of this research project was to assess the response of transit agencies to this 
Overmatch Initiative. Will it provide increased leverage to Federal and local officials to increase 
the level of transit investment in urban areas? Are there examples of "good" practice or 
innovative approaches to providing a greater-than-required local match? What role does the 
private sector have in providing a part of the local share? What recommendations can be made 
regarding future Federal actions in transit financing? Does the Overmatch Initiative provide 
guidance to the U.S. Department of Transportation on how overmatch provisions could be 
incorporated into other grant programs? In addition to these questions, the research team 
examined the Section 15 transit performance monitoring database to determine if such a -database 
could be used to monitor the possible trends in local transit inv t:s• - rient as it relates to greater 
local commitments. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research project consisted of four major tasks. The first wz to review existing data sets 
(such as Section 15) and specific transit investment proposals to determine the status of transit 
investment today. The intent of this task was to describe major characteristics of local transit 
finance, and through a literature search, identify the theoretical and practical factors that relate 
to the use of Federal incentives to influence local financing decisions. If the transit Overmatch 
Initiative was just another example of a Federal program that pros des incentives for a greater 
local match, the effectiveness of the Intiative could perhaps benefit from knowing the results of 
these other programs. On the other hand, if the Overmatch Initiative was unique, its experience 
could be influential in the development of other Federal policies. To determine the "uniqueness" 
of the Initiative, contacts were made with the Advisory Council on itergovernmental Relations, 
the General Accounting Office, the Department of the Treasury, Public Technology, Inc., the 
National League of Cities, the American Association of State L.ghway and Transportation 
Officials, several State departments of transportation, and several university research centers. 
The second major task was to prepare and conduct a national survey of transit agencies to 
identify the capital investment strategies currently under consideration. This survey was 
designed to explore the local experience with transit investment and exposure to the Overmatch 
Initiative. If an investment had been developed within the Overmatch Initiative context, that is, 
a greater-than-required local share was being proposed, further questions were asked regarding 
the sources of the additional local funding and the role of the private sector. Even if the transit 
agency did not have any projects developed with an overmatch ; rovision, the survey asked 
subjective questions on local perspectives on the Initiative and asked respondents to identify 
recommended changes. The survey was pre-tested at the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit 
Authority (MARTA) and through a series of visits with MARTA officials, the questions were 
refined to reflect a typical transit agency's understanding of the survey questions. The surveys 
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were mailed to the 65 largest transit agencies in the country. Follow-up letters and phone calls 
were made to encourage agency response. Of the 65 surveys mailed, 44 were completed and 
sent to the research team. More than 90 percent of the transit agencies actually involved in 
large-scale, capital investment responded to the survey. The survey instrument is shown in 
appendix A. 
The third task was to review and assess the results of this survey. This assessment included 
the identification of any trends or themes that occurred across all agency responses. The survey 
results were used in comparison with the Section 15 data to determine if this monitoring process 
truly reflected reported State and local funding for transit. This review also was used to identify 
a small number of cases that became the subject of more detailed analysis. This more detailed 
analysis focussed on those cities where unique or innovative local funding strategies had 
occurred, or were occurring, within the context of the Overmatch Initiative; or where some 
aspect of the local response was determined to be important to understanding the effectiveness 
of the Initiative; or where strong opinions for or against the Initiative had been indicated in the 
survey. 
The final task was to conduct a more detailed analysis of specific case sites. These sites 
included Atlanta, Baltimore, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Each of these 
cases provided some interesting perspective on local funding strategies and on agency response 
to the Overmatch Initiative. Atlanta was chosen for its aggressive pursuit of Federal funds in 
the expansion of the MARTA system. Baltimore was selected because of its ambitious 
construction of a light rail line through the region and its very high share of non-Federal funds. 
Denver was included in this detailed analysis because it did not have an Overmatch project, but 
was definitely trying to participate in the program. Houston was an important site because of 
its rather large proposed private sector contribution and the difficulties in assuring that such a 
financial commitment would occur over the many years often necessary to build a facility. Los 
Angeles was included because it was the first major investment project which had reflected in 
the full funding agreement with UMTA provisions for local overmatch. In addition, the private 
sector contribution (through benefit assessments) became embroiled in legal challenges and thus 
shows the uncertainties that can be associated with a diverse range of local funding sources. San 
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Francisco exhibited a programmatic approach to the Overmatch Ift xwve by proposing a regional 
rail plan consisting of numerous rail facilities, each having differing Federal shares, but in total 
having a very low overall Federal participation. Each site was visited and more detailed 
questions and exploration of the survey responses for that city were made. 
It was expected that this research would provide Federal, State, and local officials with a 
better understanding of what is occurring nationally with transit financing, and in particular with 
the Overmatch Initiative. Although not originally part of the resez.ch objectives, the results of 
the research also provided some useful guidance on effective polio implementation. 
REPORT ORGANIZATION 
This report is organized into five major sections. The next section examines the historical 
context of the Overmatch Initiative and the concepts found in public finance, political science 
and the economics literature that relate to the basic principles found in the Initiative. The second 
section discussed the results of the survey. Included in this section are summaries of the key 
findings from this survey analysis. The third section describes in more detail the experiences 
of the six case studies. The fourth section presents the results of the research effort that 
focussed on the Section 15 database. The final section presents the project conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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THE OVERMATCH INITIATIVE AND FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
Before discussing the theoretical and practical concepts that underpin the use of Federal 
incentives to change local decisionmaking, it is first necessary to understand what the Overmatch 
Initiative is. The next section provides a history of the Initiative, followed by a review of 
theoretical concepts that form the foundation of such efforts. 
THE OVERMATCH INITIATIVE IN AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The history of the Overmatch Initiative can be traced back to the early 1970's when UMTA 
officials, concerned about the large Federal commitment to rail starts (and with many new 
proposals on the drawing boards), teamed with the Federal Highway Administration to 
promulgate the Joint Transportation Planning Regulations.' One of the requirements of these 
regulations was the development of a Transportation System Management (TSM) plan which 
identified the actions that could be taken in metropolitan areas to make more efficient use of 
transportation systems.' This was one of the first formal efforts on the part of UMTA to 
encourage a re-examination of local transportation priorities in the hopes of shifting priorities 
toward smaller-scale, less capital-intensive projects. 
In May, 1984, UMTA issued a new policy statement on the criteria for Federal financial 
support for new mass transportation investments. Known as the "New Start Policy", this policy 
was developed in response to the legislative history of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act 
of 1982 which included references to cost effective investment decisions and the provision of 
extra local financial effort in funding transit investments. The 1984 Senate Appropriations 
Committee Report (adopted in conference) also spoke about funding decisions based on the 
results of alternatives analyses, a determination of cost effectiveness, and the degree of local 
'Urban Mass Transportation Administration and Federal Highway Administration, 
"Transportation Improvement Program", Federal Register, September 17,1975. 
2 For a description of the TSM policy, see Gakenheimer and Meyer, "The Sources and 
Prospects of TSM," Journal of the American Planning Association.  January, 1979. 
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financial commitment, the latter of which included some assessment of stable and reliable 
funding sources to maintain and operate the system. The New Start pclicy outlined the 
that transit agencies needed to follow to be considered for Federal grants. In particular, the 
policy presented a rating system that was to be used by UMTA in determining its financial 
commitment. The rating system nsisted of two major parts--not surprisingly given the 
legislative history, cost effectiveness and local financial effort. Local financial effort was 
defined as the degree of oc :match, or the percent of pr,ject costs met in addition to the 
statutorly required 25 percent; an as7:.ssment of the capital financing plan, and a judgement on 
the stability and reliability of the funding source to operate the system once constructed. 
One of the first efforts to provi • the required assessment of local financial effort was done 
for UMTA in 1985 by Lowrey and Co.' The assessment of the 13 New Start projects that were 
in the pipeline at that time was conducted on a subjective sis, assigning a low, medium, or 





Projects funded up to 30 percent from local 
revenue sources. This inc' ded those projects which 
provided the statutory re . .red 25 percent local 
are. 
Projects funded with greater than 30 percent, but less 
than 50 percent non-Federal f nds. 
Projects to be funded whir exceed 50 percent non-
Federal contribution. 
Based on these criteria, only two New Start projects received a ''high" rating for overmatch, 
six received "medium", and the remaining four received "low" n gs. 
The next major development occurred on March 13, 1989 when Secretary Skinner, in an 
appearance before the Legislative Conference of the American Public Transit Association 
(APTA), announced the Overmatch Initiative. This announcemef was followed the next day 
3 Lowrey and Co., Inc. "Financial Ratings of Proposed nv-Start Fixed Guideway 
Projects," Report UMTA-NY-06-0120-85-1, January, 198', 
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by a "Dear Colleague" letter from the UMTA Administrator to all transit properties which 
outlined the basics of the Initiative. The APTA Passenger Transport had the announcement as 
a major news item the following week. 4 All three announcements indicated that further 
technical guidance on how to respond to the Overmatch Initiative would be forthcoming from 
UMTA. Such guidance was not issued. 
The Overmatch Initiative, as announced by Secretary Skinner, contains many elements that 
are important for understanding the overall thrust of the policy. The Overmatch Initiative would 
provide an opportunity for State and local governments who were able to shoulder an increased 
share of the financing burden for mass transit capital needs to receive increased consideration 
of their projects by the Federal government. For this increased non-Federal share, the 
Department of Transportation would add extra weight in the ranking of applications having local 
overmatch and would also "reciprocate by processing those grants in a more expeditious manner 
and with whatever reductions in the amount and kind of both pre-award and post-award review 
that may by permitted under the law." The specifics of these amounts and kinds of reductions 
were, of course, of paramount interest to local officials. 
The following characteristics of the Overmatch Initiative merit special attention. 
1. One of the initial problems with the Overmatch Initiative was a legal interpretation 
of what could be overmatched. Section 4 (a) of the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act 
states clearly that the Federal match for a Section 3 grant shall be equal to 75 percent of the net 
project cost. Strict legal interpretation of this law implies that there cannot be a greater local 
share than the 25 percent required by statute. Such an interpretation led to the definition of an 
"undertaking". In a full-funding grant agreement for a New Start project, the undertaking 
consists of the 75/25 percent Federally-funded project plus the 100 percent locally funded 
activities that are funded in relation to the "project". The local overmatch is calculated based 
on the Federal share of the total undertaking cost. 
4 American Public Transportation Association, "New Incentive Program for 
Discretionary Transit Grants", Passenger Transport. vol.47, no. 12, March 20, 
1989. 
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_ 	2. The local funding commitment must be for capital, not operations. These funds must 
also be in place or be assured for them to count toward the local funding share. 
3. The Overmatch Initiative pertains to Section 3 funding categories. Section 3 contains 
three such categories, often referred to as "Tiers". Each is described below, along with the 
overmatch characteristics associated with each. 
--Rail Modernization: This category includes the rehabilitation and renovation of older 
fixed guideway transit systems. T program category is primarily aimed at the eight U.S. 
urban areas having older rail systems (Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Northern New 
Jersey, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco). If these systems were to provide a 50 
percent local match for projects in this category, the agencies would see significant 
administrative improvements in UMTA grant approvals and management, as well as 
consideration for multi-year rail grants. 
--Bus and Bus-Related:  This investment category covers the purchase of buses and the 
construction of bus-related facilities. UMTA had established five "funding priorities" for the 
evaluation of these applications. In order of priority, these were projects consisting of: 1) 
statutory, contractural and administrative commitments, 2) bus maintenance facilities, 3) bus 
vehicles for new and expanded service, 4) replacement vehicles, and 5) other bus or bus-related 
projects. According to the Initiative announcement, grantees would have their applications 
elevated to the next highest priority level for each 10 percent overmatch provided. Within each 
priority level, the projects would be ranked according to the level of overmatch provided. 
--New Starts: This category includes the construction of new fixed guideway systems and 
extensions to existing ones. Much of the documentation required for new facilities is outside 
the control of UMTA (e.g., environmental impact statements). Tin_ UMTA could not promise 
to reduce the paperwork associated with such projects. However, the Overmatch Initiative 
promised for those projects requesting less than 30 percent Federal participation that Ul4TA 
would expedite its review of the documentation. In addition, and of some importance to several 
cities, such a commitment of local funds could relax the UMTA policy of "one-corridor-at-a-
time" for alternatives analysis and Federal investment. 
In addition to these specific categorical programs, there is so e evidence to suggest that 
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UMTA would also entertain a multi-year, large-scale, comprehensive transit plan that 
cuinmulatively had a lower than 75 percent Federal share, but which included individual projects 
at varying levels of Federal commitment. The San Francisco case described later in this report 
presents such a transit plan, and local officials there felt that they had received some indication 
from the U.S. Department of Transportation that such a plan combined with substantial local 
overmatch could, in fact, be included in the Overmatch Initiative. 
OVERMATCH IN A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMICS CONTEXT 
One of the important tasks of this research project was to determine the relationship between 
the Overmatch Initiative and the structure of intergovernmental program management that exists 
in this country. This determination was made by investigating current funding programs that 
require local match, and through a review of the relevant literature. 
The research team identified several States that have economic development funding 
programs that require some local funding match from the target community. The Michigan 
Department of Transportation, for example, has an economic development investment program 
that awards grants to communities on a statewide competitive basis. A 25 percent local match 
is required, although the Transportation Commission can waive this local match requirement in 
case of economic hardship. Michigan Department of Transportation officials have found that 
a vast majority of projects propose the 25 percent match. Some communities have proposed 
projects with a local match of as high as 40 percent. The Commission has taken special note 
of such a local commitment and has considered it to be an important indication that project 
proponents are serious about the project. However, the Michigan DOT officials stressed that 
projects are not prioritized on the basis of overmatch. In fact, there was some feeling that these 
overmatch projects were not as technically "worthy" as those meeting the 25 percent requirement 
and thus have tended not to be funded. 
The Iowa DOT economic development program is recognized as one of the most 
comprehensive in the country. The program has been in operation for five years and is aimed 
at helping communities attract business. The community, which applies to the State DOT, must 
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provide some local match, the exact amount of which is negotiated based on the number of jobs 
that are likely to be created. Usually, the match is in the vicinity of 20 percent. If a community 
contributes more than the 20 percent (or whatever the percentage r _quired by the State through 
negotiations), the likelihood of receiving State funds is enhanced. However, State officials 
emphasized that the decision on grants has been made on the basis of many different factors, and 
that overmatch is just one consideration. In fact, when compared to the other technical and 
political factors, overmatch was not considered to be really that important. 
The Massachusetts Executive Office of Transportation and Construction funds a 
transportation/economic development program called Public Works and Economic Development 
(PWED). This program was initially structured to be a 100 percent State-funded program. The 
response from local communities was so ovec-vhelming, and in some cases so technically weak, 
that the State decided to require a local match of 25 percent to assure a local community's 
commitment to the project. In some cases, local communities have proposed higher local 
matching. In particular, for those projects where private developers were going to receive 
primary benefit from the road improvement, the community was usually able to combine local 
funds with private funds to provide greater than 25 percent local match. State officials feel this 
program has been very successful, and have, in some cases, placed greater weight to those 
applications having a greater local share. However, State officials also worry about the 
implications of those communities being able to afford local match or who are able to obtain 
private sector contributions overwhelming those communities not as able to provide local share. 
This equity consideration has led to the State trying to consider the -fiscal ability of the applicant 
in its decision to award PWED grants so that those who need the grants the most receive them. 
For transit investment, there are few examples in the literature .1 local applicants providing 
a greater-than-required local share. The transit finance literature is heavily focussed on the 
different types of funding arrangements and innovative private sector contributions that are being 
tried around the country. The literature is too voluminous to review in detail here. As an 
example, however, a report entitled Dedicated Funding Arrangements fpr Public Transit Systems 
provides a description of the dedicated funding sources, the legislative histories, and lessons 
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learned from six metropolitan area transit systems. 5 A report entitled Financing for the Future:  
Changing Roles in Mass Transit reviews the important financing roles now being adopted by the 
States and examines four projects that have relied on private sector participation in the operations 
of transit services. 6 A major trend found in most of the reports on transit finance is the 
significantly enhanced role of the States in funding mass transportation, combined with an 
increasing local willingness to establish dedicated funding sources for the funding of transit 
investment. Certainly, this local willingness is not universal, but there does seem to be a trend 
toward the use of dedicated taxes for transit, especially in those areas where congestion is 
considered to be a major problem. 
The public finance and intergovernmental relations literature is full of descriptions of 
Federal/State/local grant programs. Most of this discussion relates to the specifics of 
intergovernmental transfers within a Federal system of government. Very few articles examine 
the use of matching and the requirement of higher local match as a means of meeting national 
objectives. One of the few articles that does discuss this topic was written by Bezdek and 
Jones.' In this article, the authors examine the efficiency with which the Federal categorical, 
or conditional, grants-in-aid system achieves desired objectives. They point out that such a 
question is an important one given that, as of 1988, there were over 400 Federal categorical 
grant programs with about 60 percent involving some form of local match. In examining 
Federal grants for the fiscal years 1983 and 1984, the authors concluded that State/local 
governments spended substantially larger sums in the target areas than the levels which were 
required to qualify for the Federal funding. In addition, the authors argue that if the government 
went to open-ended, conditional grants, with local share requirements that matched local desires 
for obtaining the Federal funds, a greater stimulus and local commitment would be provided to 
5 U.S. Department of Transportation, Dedicated Funding Arrangements for Public Transit 
Systems, Office of the Secretary, June 1985. 
6 Krause, R., D. Patel, and B. Gathy, Financing for the Future: Changing Roles in Mass  
Transit, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, December 1987. 
7 Bezdek, R. and J. Jones, "Federal Categorical Grants-In-Aid and State-Local Government 
Expenditures," Public Finance, vol. 43, no.1, 1988. 
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State/local agencies to invest in the target programs. 
_ The article presents information on the State/local matching requirements for Federal grants 
over a period of 15 years, from 1971 to 1986. This information is shown in Table 1 which 
indicates an increasing average local match over this 15-year period (due, in part, to the 
relatively high matching ratio for Medicaid of 45 percent). Of particular interest was an analysis 
which showed the ratio of actual State/local spending compared to that required to receive 
Federal funding. This information for FY 1984 is shown in Table 2. The authors conclude 
their analysis by arguing that because many Federal grants require relatively low amounts of 
local match, such grants are viewed by local officials as iivalent to unconditional, general-
purpose grants in their impact. 
The economics literature, particularly that which focuses on public investment, has examined 
the effects of intergovernmental grants on State/local expenditures from the perspective of social 
benefits. Perhaps the most recent analysis on this issue has been undertaken by Gramlich. 8 The 
economic basis for categorical grants, according to economists, is the concept of benefit 
spillovers. This concept is shown in Figure 1. Line D in Figure 1 represents the demand 
function for some public good provided by a specific community. However, citizens of other 
communities might benefit from this public good as well (e.g., p2 -3, roads, etc.). 
Therefore, the demand function D represents the summation of demand for the public good of 
all who benefit. If the marginal cost of the public good is denoted as P = MC (as shown in 
Figure 1, the community acting alone will provide simply Q units whereas the social optimum 
level would be Q*. One way of correcting this situation is for a t . Lher level of government to 
pay m* of the cost of each unit of public good, thus reducing its prize to P(1-m*) and increasing 
public spending to Q*. Of course, if the amount of funds from the higher level of government 
is limited, local public spending ri:- to that point where there is no longer any subsidies, point 
QK in Figure 1, after which the price reverts back to P = MC and the quantity produced stays 
at Q. Thus, from a national perspective, the provision of Federal funds would not assure the 
optimal level of overall funding for a public good. As note by ( 	the provision of 
8 Gramlich, E., A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis, Sec d Edition, Prentice Hall, 
1990. 
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TABLE 1-STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT MINIMUM 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1971 B 28,099 II 12,036 11 40,135 70.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
72 34,375 15,252 49,627 69.3 30.7 100.0 
73 41,847 NA' NA NA NA NA 
74 43,357 NA NA NA NA NA 
75 49.791 NA NA NA NA NA 
1976 59,094 21,975 81,069 72.9 27.1 100.0 
TQ 15,920 3,676 21,596 73.7 26.3 100.0 
77 68,415 26,253 94,668 72.3 27.7 100.0 
78 77,889 27,603 105,492 73.8 26.2 100.0 
79 82,858 29,840 112,698 73.5 26.5 100.0 
1980 91,451 33,931 125,382 72.9 27.1 100.0 
81 94,762 39,668 134,430 70.5 29.5 100.0 
82 88,195 39,804 127,999 68.9 31.1 100.0 
83 92,496 39,694 132,190 70.0 30.0 100.0 
84 97,577 46,972 144,549 67.5 32.5 100.0 
1985 est 107,016 54,000 161,016 66.5 33.5 100.0 
86 est 100,668 52,969 153,637 65.5 34.5 100.0 
'OMB analysts calculated these by estimating from the statutory matching requimmenu the 
minimum amount required to be spent by State-local govermnenu on each matching grant program to 
qualify for maximum Federal funds. 
*A: Not available. 
Source: 	Bezdek and Jones, "Federal Categorical Grants-in-Aid and State-Local 
Government Expenditures,' Public Finance, vol. 43, no. 1. 1988. 
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TABLE 2-COMPARISON OF REQUIRED LOCAL RATIO TO 























(1) (2) CI) (4) (3) 
Tote. 11.306 19911.723 1142.342 1353.405 19 
Elation emd 1.1brariet 0 13.401 13207 171.321 13.1 
ifiesomary sad Secondary .10 9.414 13.449 120.196 9.0 
Nieto Edmond= 0 4.120 0 47213 Sc 
1.1brar■ -SO 14 141 2.413 14.3 
• Edenotion 0 0 0 7219 • C 
litgbeem .14 10.304 12013 39216 3.3 
imersuus .10 3.1329 3.366 5,237 1.6 
Primer', lecoodary. sod Urban .13 7.412 4,014 1.129 2.0 
Odier Hietways JO 3.763 4,701 26,130 5.6 
Public welfare .40 40,054 117.036 74,204 1.1 
Medical Maniacs .45 21,141 *438 39.311 1.0 
Maintenance Amistance .46 1.268 13,311 15.311 1.0 
Other Medan .20 10.645 13,706 19,312 1.5 
Halt! end Hospitals -20 4,070 5.096 46,419 7.2 
Health .20 3,972 4,965 1.7,77! 2.5 
Hospitals .25 91 131 34,142 181.6 
Natural Bemoan .23 2.621 3.511 7.421 2.1 
Fitt and Iliddlife .30 150 214 1.014 4 7 
Foram .25 232 309 583 1.9 
Otber Newel lamoerces _23 2.766 2.995 5,124 1.9 
Pares nod Reovezion _35 71 109 1.343 76.4 
Public Imlay .23 90 116 41,713 3012 
Police Protosice .25 37 49 19.262 390.5 
Fire Protection 0 3 0 3.202 Sc 
Correa:Me 25 30 67 MOH 166.3 
Promo:he lespection aid Legulation 0 0 0 3.233 Sc 
Environment .29 2.971 4,172 16.226 3.9 
Sewage .30 2,604 3,720 11.516 11 
Pelmets AiRME/WIM Mid Comm! .15 340 222 1.723 4.3 
Otbsr Eavironmental .23 127 IN 3,413 30.6 
Hooting end Urban Renewal' .40 11.817 14.695 9.213 .6 
01rP0n6 .30 455 374 3.584 6.2 
Urban Meet Toemportatioe -30 3,693 7.390 13.331 1.8 
Mater Tramp:et sad Terminals .30 71 101 1,329 13.1 
Social Imeraes edeedinratioe 0 2,039 0 2.336 Sc 
%wan Iliorims .30 123 11.3 223 1.2 
Utilities 25 211 a 31.130 375.4 
Elmstic Li& sad Pourer 0 167 0 23.206 Sc 
G. apply .23 4 5 3.344 627.0 
Maw Supply -25 47 63 12.510 200.1 
6mmott on General Debt 0 0 0 N.696 • C 
Gomm! Fiscal iMseaseace 0 4450 5 5 Sc 
Other and Combimed .20 2,714 3.393 14213 K. 1 
Source: 	Bezdek and Jones, "Federal Categorical Gra is-in-Aid and State-Local 
Government Expenditures," public Finance. vol. 43, no. 1. 1988. 
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Output 0 
When spending (a) exceeds the kink point (OKI, the matching rate OM could be lowered to 
m', and the grant merle open-ended. Spending would rise from 0 to 0' and the efficiency 
gain is area E. 
Source: Gramlich, A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis,  Prentice-Hall, 1990 
Figure 1—Efficiency of Grants 
generous matching terms in effect defeats the purpose of the grant program which stimulates 
less-than-optimal local government spending. 
In summary, then, there is some evidence to suggest that the concept of an overmatch policy 
will, in fact, provide an improved efficiency in the provision of Federal grants. The literature 
and case examples of such an approach, however, is sparse. The transit finance literature 
suggests that one of the major trends in transit finance is a greater share of transit investment 
being provided by State and local governments. And although the private sector is playing an 
increasingly more important role in cases, by far the major actors in the financing of major new 
facilities are the State and local government agencies. 
The following sections explore the experience to date with the Overmatch Initiative. From 
the research team's investigation, it is one of the first funding policies of its kind in 
transportation, and perhaps even across all areas of Federal government responsibilities. As 
such, it deserves attention on its possible successes and applications in other areas of 
intergovernmental transfers. 
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NATIONAL TRENDS IN TRANSIT CAPITAL ASSISTANCE, OPERATING 
REVENUES/ASSISTANCE, AND SERVICE SUPPLIED 
AND CONSUMED 
In order to establish the transit financing context for this project, the research team 
conducted an analysis of national trends in the transit industry from 1984 to 1987 as indicated 
by Section 15 data. Such use of the Section 15 data has been found in the literature, and is 
generally considered a valid approach for determining trends in transit finance.' Measures of 
national transit industry capital assistance, operating revenues and assistance, and service 
supplied and consumed measures were used in the analysis. Of particular interest was an 
examination of any measurable overmatch effects that resulted from the announcement of the 
New Starts policy. Comparisons were made between those communities (and their transit 
agencies) that were in the pipeline for "new start" projects as of January 1990, and those that 
were not. This analysis had two principle objectives: 
1. To identify the aggregate national effects the overmatch criterion of the New 
Starts policy may have had on local transit capital finance decisions prior to the 
development of the Overmatch Initiative. 
2. To identify whether the aggregate effects of overmatch varied between 
communities that were in the pipeline for Federal transit capital assistance for 
"new start" rail projects versus those communities that were not in the pipeline, 
as of January 1990. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data: This analysis was based on data from UMTA's National Urban Mass 
Transportation Statistics: Section 15 Annual Reports (1984 through 1987), the most recent, 
comprehensive information on national transit trends available in published form for all public 
transit agencies at the aggregate and disaggregate levels of analysis. Data on capital assistance, 
9 Ferguson, Erik. 1988. U.S. Transit Management and Performance: Local and National 
Priorities and the Impact of Technology. Transportation Planning and Technology 14(3): 
199-215. 
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operating revenues, and service supplied and consumed were used in this analysis. The 
following materials were available from various sources: 
Magnetic tape data: The research team acquired complete national data from all 1979-
1986 Section 15 reports for all transit agencies in the U.S. at the disaggregate level. The 
formatting and variable definitions on each tape varied slightly from one year to the next, 
but all of the raw data was available for use. A statistical analysis package was used to 
analyze this data. A numb of comparisons across all transit agencies were possible 
with this package. For example, one could look at factors influencing current levels of 
capital expenditures for all agencies making, or planning to make, such expenditures. 
One could also select specific information for specific years for surveyed agencies only. 
Data user's guide: The research team had a complete set of instructions on the 
interpretation and use of data collected through the UMTA Section 15 reporting system 
over its entire span, 1979-present. 
Published data: The research team acquired the published UMTA Section 15 Annual 
Reports in single volumes for 1984-1987, the four most recent years available. l° Data 
10 Shorter, Rhoda and William C. Ammann. 1989. National Urban Mass Transportation Statistics:  
1987 Section 15 Annual Report. Report No. UMTA-VA-06-0127-89-1. U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Office of Grants Management, 
Washington, D.C., September 1989. 
Shorter, Rhoda and William C. Ammann. 1988. National Urban Mass Transportation Statistics:  
1986 Section 15 Annual Report. Report No. UMTA-VA-06-0127-88-1. U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Office of Grants Management, 
Washington, D.C., June 1988. 
Kerr, Carol and Linda Lally. 1987. National Urban Mass Transportation Statistics: 1985 Section 
15 Annual Report. Report No. UMTA-IT-06-0310-87-1. U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Office of Grants Management, Washington, D.C., 
August 1987. 
Kerr, Carol and Linda Lally. 1986. National Urban Mass Transportation Statistics: 1984 Section 
15 Annual Report. Report No. UMTA-IT-06-0310-86-1. U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Office of Technical Assistance, Washington, D.C., 
September 1986. 
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for 1988 was not available. These annual reports included aggregate statistics on selected 
variables for all transit agencies combined, or specific sub-groups (e.g., agencies with 
500+ peak vehicles). Also included were individual agency observations for selected 
variables, which could be manually input into a spreadsheet template for overmatch 
agencies only. For example, Table 3.04 in the 1987 report (pp. 3-36 to 3-47) identifies 
sources of public transit capital assistance, in dollars and on a percentage basis. The 
following tables, disaggregated by reporting transit agency, were used in each of the four 
published reports: 
3.01: Total operating revenues 
3.02: Dedicated state operating assistance 
3.03: Dedicated local operating assistance 
3.04: Total capital revenues 
3.05: Dedicated state capital assistance 
3.06: Dedicated local capital assistance 
3.16: Service supplied and consumed 
Methodology:  Using UMTA's "new start" pipeline list, 26 transit systems which were 
currently in the pipeline for new light rail systems or extensions were identified (see Table 3). 
Section 15 data for these 26 transit systems by year and table identified above were transferred 
to a spreadsheet template. These data were combined to create a "pipeline" category for each 
year and table. The totals for each year and table were entered in the spreadsheet. Differences 
between industry-wide totals and "pipeline" totals were separately identified as "non-pipeline" 
totals. 
A number of non-trivial problems were identified with the application of this methodology, 
as follows: 
1. The 1984 Section 15 data were not summarized in the same fashion as were the data for 
the other three years. In combining the 1984 data which was given into totals, some problems 
with comparing service supplied and consumed totals for 1984 with the other three years became 
apparent. This may be a question of published data for 1984 being reported inaccurately or 
improperly transcribed. 
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TABLE 3—NEW START PIPELINE COMMUNITIES AND PROJECT STATUS 
Number of Projects 
Alternatives 	Pre- 	Final 
Location 	Analysis Engineering Design 
Under 
Construction Total 
Atlanta 	 1 2 3 
Austin 1 1 
Baltimore 	1 1 2 
Buffalo 1 1 
Chicago 	1 -% 1 2 
Cleveland 1 1 
Dallas 	 1 1 
Denver 1 1 
Honolulu 	1 1 
Houston 1 3 4 
Jacksonville 1 1 2 
Los Angeles 1 1 1 3 
Miami 1 1 
Minneapolis 	2 2 
Newark 	1 1 
New York 1 1 
Orange County, CA 1 1 
Pittsburgh 	1 1 
Portland, OR 1 1 
Saint Louis 1 1 
Salt Lake City 	1 1 
San Diego 	1 1 2 
San Francisco 1 1 2 
San Jose, CA 	1 1 2 
Seattle 1 1 
Washington, DC 1 1 
Totals 	 19 4 5 12 40 
1. As of January 1990. The thirty or so projects in the systems planning stage were not 
included. 
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2. The 1987 service consumed data for "pipeline" transit systems was incomplete. Several 
of these items were listed in the 1987 report as questionable (Q), no response (NR) or (W). 
Specific performance measures were missing for one or more modes for each of the following 
transit systems in 1987: 
Unlinked passenger trips: Austin and Santa Clara County (NR); Houston (Q). 
Passenger miles: Austin (W); Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, 
Jacksonville, Miami, Minneapolis, Newark, Orange County, CA, Pittsburgh, Portland, 
San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle (Q). 
3. Dedicated state and local capital assistance fluctuated considerably during this short four-
year time period. Some systems reported a large amount of "dedicated" assistance in one year, 
and nothing at all in other years, either before or after. This may be a problem of definition, 
in that truly "dedicated" revenues presumably should flow for more than a single year in order 
to warrant their inclusion in this type of category. 
4. Dedicated State and local operating and capital assistance from Tables 3.01 and 3.04 
generally did not coincide exactly with the figures from Tables 3.02, 3.03, 3.05, and 3.06. 
Presumably, some transit systems failed to identify the exact nature and source of dedicated state 
and local operating and capital assistance, making the data in Tables 3.02, 3.03, 3.05, and 3.06 
incomplete. These forms may have been omitted entirely by some transit agencies in their 
Section 15 annual reports, as is their right under voluntary levels of reporting. 
RESULTS 
Results are reported separately for capital assistance, operating revenues, and service 
supplied and consumed statistics for 1984 through 1987. A comparison of financial and 
performance trends for transit agencies in pipeline and non-pipeline cities completes the analysis. 
Capital Assistance: Total industry-wide public transit capital assistance fell from $3,871 
million in 1984 to $3,391 million in 1987, a 12% decline in nominal terms, and a much larger 
decline in real terms (see Table 4). Pipeline transit systems lost 15% of their total public capital 
assistance during this time period, while non-pipeline transit systems lost only 8% of their total 
public capital assistance. In 1987, fully 65 % of all public capital assistance still went to pipeline 
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TABLE 4-U.S. TRAINSI)T GRANT ASSISTANCE 
Percent 
Change 
Source 1984 »5 1986 1987 1984-87 
Total (Millions) $3,871 $3,398 $3,833 $3,391 -12.4% 
Federal Share 
UMTA Sec. 3 35.4% 36.0% 33.4% 24.9% -38.4% 
UMTA Sec. 5,9,9a 9.7 14.9 23.6 31.1 +180.8% 
Other UMTA 13.7 11.8 11.2 12.0 -23.3% 
Other USDOT 1.9 10 0.9 0.7 -67.7% 
Other Federal 0.6 LI _QS +31.4% 
Total 61.3 771.7 70.4 69.6 -0.6% 
State Share 
General Revenues 9.7% 6.9% 9.7% 5.1% -54.0% 
Dedicated Taxes 2.9 4.2 3.7 4.1 +23.8% 
Tolls 0.3 02 0.3 0.4 +16.8% 
.,Lit-2: State 3,S1 _5.Q ./1 _15 -21.0% 
Total 15.9 16.3 16.2 12.1 -23.9% 
Local Share 
General Revenues 3.5% 4.3% 5.7% 7.1% +77.7% 
Dedicated Taxes 8.5 4.2 4.6 6.8 -29.9% 
Tolls 1.8 0.4 1.9 3.0 + 46.6% 
Other Local _al LI _L5 -85.2% 
Total 22.7 12.2 13.5 18.4 -8.0% 
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transit systems. Federal capital assistance remained virtually constant between 1984 and 1987, 
while State capital assistance fell 33% and local capital assistance fell 29%. Further, State and 
local public capital assistance was extremely unstable between 1984 and 1987, sometimes 
increasing, at other times decreasing, by as much as 70% from one year to the next. This lack 
of State and local capital funding stability may impair the transit industry's ability to make sound 
judgment calls concerning long range transit capital project planning. 
In 1987, $139 million in dedicated State capital assistance was provided to the transit 
industry as a whole from various State funding sources, including "other" taxes ($76M), 
property taxes ($25M), gasoline taxes ($18M), sales taxes ($16M), and commuter taxes ($4M). 
Pipeline transit systems received only 51 % of dedicated State capital assistance in 1987 (see 
Table 5). Pipeline transit systems were more likely to receive their dedicated State capital 
assistance in the form of "other" taxes and commuter taxes, while all other types of dedicated 
State taxes were received predominantly by non-pipeline transit systems. 
In 1987, $231 million in dedicated local capital assistance was provided to the transit 
industry as a whole from various local funding sources, including sales taxes ($154M), property 
taxes ($63M), and "other" taxes ($13M). Pipeline transit systems received fully 65% of this 
dedicated local capital assistance in 1987 (see Table 6). Pipeline transit systems were more 
likely to receive their dedicated local capital assistance in the form of sales tax revenues and 
"other" local taxes. Non-pipeline transit systems were more likely to receive their dedicated 
local capital assistance in the form of local property taxes. 
Operating Assistance:  Industry-wide transit operating revenues increased from $10.04 
billion in 1984 to $13.38 billion in 1987, a 33% increase, at least in nominal terms (see Table 
7). In 1987, 57% of all transit operating revenues were generated by the 26 pipeline transit 
systems identified in this study. Pipeline transit systems increased their operating revenues by 
less than 20% between 1984 and 1987. Non-pipeline transit systems increased their operating 
revenues by 57% during the same time period. It appeared that pipeline transit systems may 
have been trying purposefully to keep operating expenses (and revenues) down, in order to 
increase capital spending in anticipation of gearing up for their "new start" light and heavy rail 
projects. Between 1984 and 1987, non-pipeline transit systems increased total operating 
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TABLE 5-STATE TAXES DEDICATED TO THEIR SOURCE FOR 
TRANSIT CAPITAL ASSISTANCE 
Percent 
Change 
Source 1984 1985 1986 : f 1984-87 
Total (Millions) $112.8 $141.9 $142.9 $139.1 -23.3% 
Share 
Income Taxes 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% n/a 
Sales Taxes 34.2 12.3 18.6 11.4 -58.9% 
Property Taxes 16.3 13.6 15.2 18.1 +36.9% 
Commuter Taxes 0.8 1.5 1.2 2.8 +331.6% 
Gasoline Taxes 31.9 17.2 20.9 13 .3 -48.6% 
Other Taxes 16.9 55.2 44.0 54.4 +296.6% 
TABLE 6-LOCAL TAXES DEDICATED AT THEIR SOURCE FOR 
TRANSIT CAPITAL ASSISTANCE 




Total (Millions) $329.0 $141.5 $177.8 $231.2 -29.7% 
Share 
Income Taxes 0.1% 44.5% 0.0% 0.3% n/a 
Sales Taxes 84.0 36.9 82.3 66.7 -44.2% 
Property Taxes 14.5 9.1 3.8 273 +32.3% 
Payroll Taxes 0.1 0.0 0.0 0 0 n/a 
Utility Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 n/a 
Other Taxes 1.4 9.4 13.6 5,5 + 176.1% 
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TABLE 7-TRANSIT OPERATING REVENUES AND ASSISTANCE 
Percent 
Change 
Source 1984 1985 1986 1987 1984.87 
Total (Millions) $10,039 $10,668 $12,102 $13,384 +33.3% 
Operating Revenues 
Passenger Fares 37.1% 36.6% 35.5% 36.3% +30.5% 
Oth. Tran. Rev. 2.2 1.8 1.8 2.0 + 21.2% 
Non-Tran. Rev. 3.1 3.8 3.4 3.1 +333% 
Other _L5 1.4 11 12 +142% 
Total 50.8 50.8 48.6 48.5 +273% 
Operating Subsidies 
Federal 
UMTA Sec. 3/5 9.0% 8.1% 7.4% 6.8% + 0.7% 
State 
Gen. Rev. 11.6 11.8 12.2 123 +41.4% 
Ded. Tax, 4.0 4.0 5.2 _4,D +100.0% 
Total 15.6 15.8 18.1 18.3 +56.4% 
Local 
Gen. Rev. 13.9 13.9 14.3 15.3 +46.8% 
Pa, Tax. 10.5 10.9 11.6 ill +33.6% 
Total 24.4 24.8 25.9 26.4 +44.3% 
Total 49.2 49.2 51.2 51.5 +39.6% 
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revenues in all categories of operating revenues much faster than ,1 pipeline transit systems, 
with the exception of the following three operating revenue categories: non-passenger 
transportation revenues, Federal o2erating assistance, and State general revenue operating 
assistance. In these three areas of funding, there was no significant difference between pipeline 
and non-pipeline transit systems, at least in terms of the rate at which operating revenues grew 
between 1984 and 1987. 
In 1987, dedicated State operating assistance for public transit: totaled $616 million, which 
was distributed among the following categories of State funding: ' :thee' taxes ($342M), sales 
taxes ($241M), gasoline taxes ($31M), as well as a few other State funding categories which 
included negligible amounts of support (see Table 8). Pipeline transit systems received only 
about 15% of these dedicated State operating assistance funds in 1987. Pipeline transit systems 
received over two-thirds of their dedicated State operating assistance from "other" taxes in 1987, 
where "other" basically is undefined in the context of Section 15 data. Non-pipeline transit 
systems received over half of their dedicated State operating assistance from the "other" 
category, as well as significant assistance from dedicated State sales axes and, to a lesser extent, 
dedicated State gasoline taxes. 
In 1987, dedicated local operating assistance for public transit totaled $1.232 billion, 
which was distributed among the following categories of local funding: sales taxes ($563M), 
"other" taxes ($505M), property taxes ($115M), income taxes ($30M), and gasoline taxes 
($18M). Pipeline transit systems received fully 65% of these dedicated local operating assistance 
funds in 1987 (see Table 9). Pipeline transit systems relied more heavily on "other" dedicated 
local taxes, while non-pipeline transit systems relied more on dedicated income, gasoline, 
property, and sales taxes, i.e. all dedicated local taxes other than "other" dedicated local taxes! 
This and other supporting data suggest that a better understanding and a clearer definition 
of "other" dedicated State and local operating and capital assistance funding sources is needed, 
particularly as these relate to "new start" pipeline cities, transit systems, and projects. Although 
local and State dedicated taxes varied considerably from year to year in terms of sources and 
applications, the grand total of all local and State taxes dedicated to transit capital and operating 
assistance combined was much less variable. In 1984, about $1.8 11 don in local and State taxes 
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TABLE 8-STATE TAXES DEDICATED AT THEIR SOURCE FOR 
TRANSIT OPERATING ASSISTANCE 
Percent 
Change 
Source 1984 1985 1986 1987 1984-87 
Total (Millions) $402.5 $488.8 $536.2 $615.7 +53.0% 
Share 
Income Taxes 2.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.1% -92.4% 
Sales Taxes 29.9 38.9 39.1 39.1 +100.0% 
Property Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 n/a 
Commuter Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 n/a 
Gasoline Taxes 13.6 5.5 4.7 5.0 -43.8% 
Other Taxes 54.5 55.4 55.7 55.6 +56.1% 
TABLE 9-LOCAL TAXES DEDICATED AT THEIR SOURCE FOR 
TRANSIT OPERATING ASSISTANCE 




Total (Millions) $988 $1,127 $1,175 $1,232 +24.6% 
Share 
Income Taxes 5.3% 3.3% 2.4% 2.4% -43.6% 
Sales Taxes 52.0 39.9 45.0 45.7 +9.5% 
Property Taxes 9.0 9.1 10.4 93 +28.8% 
Gasoline Taxes 3.3 1.6 1.4 1.5 -43.4% 
Other Taxes 30.4 46.2 40.7 41.0 +68.1% 
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were dedicated to transit capital and operating assistance. In 1985 and 1986, this increased to 
$1.9 billion, and in 1987 total local r^ State taxes dedicate( to it exceeded $2 billion for 
the first time. 
Service Supplied and Consumed:  Annual vehicle miles of -vice increased by 8.4% 
between 1984 and 1987, while annual vehicle hours of service increased by only 6.0% during 
the same time period for the transit industry as whole (see Table 10). Average vehicle speeds 
thus increased marginally between hi 4 and 1987. Service supplied measures increased slightly 
more rapidly for non-pipeline than for pipeline transit systems, as one might expect, given that 
operating revenues and expenses increased more rapidly for non-pipeline than for pipeline transit 
systems during this same time period. Although service supplied measures increased for both 
pipeline and non-pipeline transit systems between 1984 and 1987, service consumed measures 
appeared to decrease. 
A trend toward reduced numbers of annual unlinked passenger trips is evident from the 
available data. This reduction in service consumed presumably is due primarily to more difficult 
market conditions for transit (e.g., lower average gasoline costs, higher average per capita 
incomes), though it could also be the result of service changes which target less productive 
markets. Given that average bus speeds seem to be increasing nationally at a time when traffic 
congestion and traffic delays appear to be increasing, strongly suggests that service changes 
favoring lower density areas with lower transit market potential may be occurring on a slight, 
but systematic basis. 
PIPELINE VERSUS NON -PIPELINE CONINTUNITIES 
It was hypothesized that pipeline communities might var, from non-pipeline communities 
in their decisions regarding transit capital and operating assistance, considering the high 
anticipated cost of most "new start" light rail projects. Ways in which such differential behavior 
might be observed at the aggregate level of analysis include the following: 
1. Pipeline communities might defer some capital investment projects, in order to create 
capital reserves in anticipation of rail construction. 
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TABLE 10-U.S. TRANSIT SERVICE SUPPLIED AND CONSUMED 







59,116 61,943 61,216 61,245 +3.6% 
Annual Vehicle 2,329 2,427 2,483 2,524 +8.4% 
Miles' 
Annual Vehicle 2,122 2,206 2,255 2,281 +7.5% 
Revenue Miles' 
Annual Vehicle 200,592 217,396 215,561 215,594 +7.5% 
Revenue Capacity 
Miles' 
Annual Vehicle 165,381 170,644 172,486 175,309 +6.0% 
Hours2 
Annual Vehicle 149,054 155,545 155,609 156,710 +5.1% 
Revenue Hours 2 
Annual Unlinked 8,714 8,375 7,930 7,848 -9.9% 
Passenger Trips' 
Annual Passenger 35,964 37,934 36,284 36,102 +0.4% 
Miles' 
Average Bus 14.24 14.18 14.49 14.56 +22% 
Speed3 
Average Unlinked 4.13 4.53 4.58 4.60 +11.5% 
Passenger Trip 
Length 
1 In millions. 
2 In thousands. 
3 Annual vehicle revenue miles divided by annual vehicle revenue hours. 
4 Annual passenger miles divided by annual unlinked passenger trips. 
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2. Pipeline communities might increase farebox revenues as a oportion of total operating 
costs, to relieve pressure on capital budgets. 
3. Pipeline communities might reduce the current level of service provided, or at least not 
increase the level of service, in order to reduce current or - ling subsidies. 
Comparative Analysis:  Pipeline cities, although representing less than 10% of all transit 
agencies in the country, consumed :11 over 60% of all transit c. al assistance (see Figure 2). 
Federal capital assistance to pipeline communities was proportion _ to total capital assistance. 
Pipeline communities received less State aid and more local aid for capital assistance than did 
non-pipeline communities during the study period. This was particularly true with respect to 
dedicated taxes for transit capital assistance (see Figures 3 and 4). In general, it appeared that 
the New Start overmatch criterion little, if any, direct effect on national trends in transit 
capital finance through 1987. 
Pipeline communities accounted for over 60% of all transit operating revenues and 
assistance in 1984, which declined to less than 60% in 1987 (see Figure 5). Pipeline cities 
generated proportionately more operating revenues, but received less Federal and State operating 
assistance than did non-pipeline cities. Pipeline communities received hardly any State taxes 
dedicated to operating assistance, but a slightly higher proportion of local taxes dedicated to 
operating assistance than did non-pipeline communities (see Figur, 6 and 7). It appeared that 
pipeline communities reduced their total operating costs relative to non-pipeline communities 
during the study period. No noticeable increase in farebox or other revenues was apparent from 
this analysis, however. 
Pipeline communities accounted for slightly less than half of the nation's total transit 
vehicle fleet during the study period (see Figure 8). Pipeline communities operated over half 
of the revenue vehicle miles and vehicle revenue hours, and over 60% of the revenue capacity 
miles, at the national level. Pipeline communities tended to operate larger vehicles more 
intensively than did non-pipeline communities. Almost 70% of all unlinked passenger trips at 
the national level were consumed on pipeline transit systems. Less than 60% of all national 
passenger miles travelled occurred on pipeline transit systems. The share of national passenger 
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FIGURE 3—STATE TAXES DEDICATED TO TRANSIT CAPITAL ASSISTANCE 
PIPELINE CITIES VS NON-PIPELINE CITIES 
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FIGURE 4-LOCAL TAXES DEDICATED TO TRANSIT CAPITAL ASSISTANCE 
PIPELINE CITIES VS NON-PIPELINE CITIES 
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FIGURE 5-U.S. TRANSIT OPERATING REVENUES AND ASSISTANCE 
BY SOURCE AND YEAR 
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FIGURE 6-STATE TAXES DEDICATED TO TRANSIT OPERATING ASSISTANCE 
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FIGURE 7-LOCAL TAXES DEDICATED TO TRANSIT OPERATING ASSISTANCE 
PIPELINE CITIES VS NON-PIPELINE CITIES 
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FIGURE 8-U.S. TRANSIT SERVICE SUPPLIED AND CONSUMED BY 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE AND YEAR 
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unavailable for 1987, due to missing information in the 1987 Sectit 15 report. 
Tables 11 and 12 show trends in average unlinked passenger trip length and average 
vehicle speeds for pipeline and non-1: 2, - -line cities. Pipeline communities tended to have much 
lower average unlinked passenger trip lengths, and slightly low= average vehicle operating 
speeds. Passenger trip lengths and operating speeds increased in bo i pipeline and non-pipeline 
cities, but at a much faster of increase in non-pipeline cities. 
It appeared that the quantity of transit service provided by p: peline cities did not change 
in relationship to non-pipeline cities between 1984 and 1987. I-T ✓ever, the quality of that 
service, as measured by average unlinked passenger trip length and erage vehicle speeds, did 
seem to change slightly. 
CONCLUSIONS 
National trends in transit performance changed only slightly between 1984 and 1987. 
Total unlinked passenger trips declined precipitously, while passenger miles remained almost 
constant. More importantly, with the exception of the first year of the program, i.e., 1984, it 
, ppeared that local and State governments failed to respond in a , significant fashion to the 
overmatch criterion for new starts by increasing their relative commitments to transit capital 
finance. 
Although the New Starts overmatch policy was found to have little if any lasting impact 
on transit capital decision making at the State and local level, this may been at least partially the 
fault of insufficient data. More detailed data on transit capital financial sources within the 
Section 15 reporting environment - 11 !ht have led to other conclusions. For example, if these 
data were available for each transit agency by mode, the effect of overmatch on "new start" light 
rail capital projects in isolation could have been undertaken. Similarly, if information on private 
matching funds, and a more descriptive definition of "other" State and local dedicated taxes, 
might have provided better clues on the direction transit capital Tina: - e is going in at the national 
level. 
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- TABLE 11—AVERAGE UNLINKED PASSENGER TRIP LENGTH IN 
PIPELINE AND NON-PIPELINE CITIES 
Percent 
Change 
1984 	1985 	1986 	1984-86 1 
Pipeline Cities 
	
3.44 	3.72 	3.66 	+ 6.4% 
Non-Pipeline Cities 
	
5.63 6.20 6.47 + 14.9% 
1 Passenger mile data for at least one mode of public transportation in each of the 
following cities were listed as questionable in the 1987 Section 15 Annual Report: Austin, 
Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Jacksonville, Miami, Minneapolis, Newark, 
Orange County, Pittsburgh, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Clara County, and 
Seattle. No comparison of average unlinked passenger trip length between pipeline and 
non-pipeline cities could be made for 1987 as a result of this missing data. 
TABLE 12-AVERAGE TRANSIT VEHICLE OPERATING SPEED IN 
PIPELINE AND NON-PIPELINE CITIES 
Percent 
Change 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1984-87 
Pipeline Cities 13.73 14.19 14.19 13.85 1 + 0.9% 
Non-Pipeline Cities 14.88 14.18 14.86 15.41 1 +3.6% 
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RESPONSE TO THE OVERMATCH INITIATIVE: THE RESULTS OF 
A NATIONAL SURVEY 
In order to assess the transit industry's response to the Overmatch Initiative, a survey 
of 65 transit agencies was conducted in Spring, 1990. This survey asked specific 
questions about agency projects that had been initiated since the 1984 New Starts policy 
and the inclusion of local overmatch in response to this policy. In addition, the survey 
asked subjective questions regarding the agency's perspectives on the subsequent 
Overmatch Initiative and suggestions for modifications. 
DATA ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY 
A number of transit agencies and others in the transit industry were contacted to gather 
information on the appropriate format and substance of the survey instrument. It was found that 
all of those contacted shared a number of perceptions about the status of the Overmatch 
Initiative. These perceptions, which were included as items on the questionnaire to test their 
validity, included the following: 
1. Good and reliable information is not readily available on required matches. 
2. Transit agencies are not responding to the Overmatch Initiative. 
3. Where additional local match is provided, it is frequently in the form of a "soft 
match", e.g., preliminary engineering and design, and R-O-W cost contributions. 
4. Transit agencies that have the resources would have overmatched even if the 
Initiative had not been in place, primarily to avoid delays associated with Federal 
procedures and oversight. 
The survey was sent to the 65 largest transit agencies in the country, with 44 responding (a 
70 percent return). The strategy was to survey broadly, i.e., the survey was not limited to those 
agencies having overmatch experience. The survey contained fifteen questions and focused on 
the following areas: extent of overmatch experience, amount of local funding, identification of 
capital construction projects and an evaluation of the Overmatch Initiative (see appendix A). 
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SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
For purposes of this analysis, L- ^h question from the survey is presented below along with 
the results for that particular question. 
Has your agency initiated or continued implementing any capital 
projects/undertakings since UMTA's Overmatch Initiative/New Starts Policy of 
1984? If yes, identify the project(s), their current stage of project development, and 
estimated project cost. 
Approximately 56 percent of the respondents had initiated capital projects. Rail projects 
dominated with approximately 40 percent of those responding identifying a rail project, w - le 
35 percent reported bus projects (see Figu!„..-, 9 and 10). Approximately 30 percent of the 
projects currently underway or proposed are station or rail yard construction. 
The project development stag.--; was classified into five categories: planning, AA/DEIS, 
preliminary engineering and design, construction and complef 1. Of the agencies that 
responded to this question, 27 percent had projects in the planning stage and another 27 percent 
reported projects that are currently undergoing AA/DEIS. Preliminary engineering and design 
have begun on projects in 47 percent of the agencies, while construction has begun on projects 
in 40 percent. Approximately 27 percent reverted projects that have been completed. These 
percentages add up to more than 100 percent because some agencies listed more than one project 
and an agency's numerous projects could be in different phases simultaneously. 
The smallest project cost estimate was $640,000, die one urban area proposed 
$900,000,000 worth of projects. The median amount was $102,000,000.00 per project. 
Approximately 14 percent of respondents had between 50 and 80 percent of project cost paid by 
the Federal government. The smallest Federal project contribution was 17 percent, the most was 
80 percent and the mean was 63 percent. The project with the highest local share had 83 
percent, while the lowest was 20 percent. The median was 30 percent. 
What are the sources of 	local are for each cap 	projects? What kind of 
overmatch is involved? 
Of the approximately 50 projects identified, the distribution by source of local share was 
quite evenly distributed--34 percent were State projects, 28 percent regional and 24 percent local 
projects. Six percent were in s2, cial districts and 8 percent in the rivate sector (see Figure 11). 
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56.10% 
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The respondents reported a wide variety of sources of these local matching funds. 
following paragraphs report the major responses that were listed on the survey. In some cases, 
the revenue sources are generally the same, but it the respondents clearly identified as a special 
source of revenue, it was summarized as such in this analysis. 
At the State level, the overmatch was offered as cash in 53 percent of the cases, 6 percent 
in 100 percent State -supported construction and rest was unknown. The largest share of the 
monies, up to 47 percent, came from 1 general fund, 18 percent from bonds, 6 percent from 
sales tax, 12 percent from gasoline tax and 6 _.': scent was unknown. 
For those "local" matchl , „: funds obtained at the regional level, there were two major 
funding sources—sales tax (29 percent) and revenue bonds (29 percent). The remaining sources 
included property tax (14 percent), State gasoline tax (7 percent), administration cost reduction 
(7 percent), UMTA (7 percent), public 4 k  'vies (7 pexc , t). 
Private Sector 
8.00% 
FIGURE 11—SOURCE OF LOCAL FUNDS FOR FIFTY CAPITAL PROJECTS 
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At the local level, cash contributions constituted 45 percent of the overmatch amount, the 
rest were in-kind services (18 percent), general funds (9 percent), and tax revenues (9 percent). 
The funding sources included the general fund (29 percent), beer tax (6 percent), tax increment 
financing (18 percent), investment returns (6 percent), passenger fares (6 percent), private sector 
(12 percent) and a valorem tax (6 percent). 
The sources of funding for the special districts were sales tax and other special taxes. No 
information about the form of match was provided. 
The private sector match was in many forms: cash, in-kind facilities or land, and others not 
identified. The sources of funding were listed as a business fund, a cooperative fund between 
the private sector and local government, and other unidentified sources. 
If any portion of the local share is being provided by non-governmental entities, 
describe the source and amount. 
Only 38 percent of the transit agencies responding to the survey answered this question. Of 
these responding, approximately 76 percent had a portion of local share provided by private 
sector/developers, the other two major categories being "university in combination with civil 
groups" and "university" (see Figure 12). 
Was this offer initiated by the non-governmental groups or was the support solicited 
by the transit agency or facilitated by other means such as zoning? 
Only 29 percent of respondents answered this question. Of this group, 22 percent indicated 
that the offer of increased local share was initiated by non-governmental groups. The remaining 
seven percent indicated that the increased local share was solicited by the transit agency. The 
vast majority of those responding to this question (71 percent) did not know who initiated the 
overmatch effort (see Figure 13). It is somewhat surprising that the survey found that non-
governmental groups were more likely to initiate the offer of local overmatch, versus 
governmental agencies. One might have expected that governmental agencies would have 
initiated the majority of the offers. It is difficult to conclude anything from this statistic given 
the large number of "unknown" answers to this question. 
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FIGURE 13—LOCAL SHARE OFFER INIT T1ON 
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To what extent did you consider the full costs of total system implementation when 
deciding to apply for Federal money for the initial projects? 
Only 43 percent of the respondents answered this question. Of those responding, only 20 
percent indicated they considered total project cost. This low level of full system cost 
consideration seems to indicate that many transit agencies either do not have the capability to 
provide such consideration, or do not want to adopt such a costing approach. 
If you are providing more local share than is required i.e., an overmatch, why are 
you doing so? 
For the agencies responding to this question, the reasons for overmatch funding are listed 
below. As in previous answers to the survey questions, these reasons are presented as given in 
response to the question. 
o Agency wanted its projects to gain a competitive edge in the funding process (25 
percent) 
o Agency wanted to reduce the level of Federal funding (25 percent) 
o Agency needed the extra Federa:, money (20 percent) 
o The private sector was willing to provide the funds (20 percent) 
o Agency wanted greater flexibility (10 percent) 
Approximately 35 percent of the respondents to this question wanted greater flexibility or 
wanted to reduce the level of Federal funding (see Figure 14). 
Based on what you have received or heard about UMTA's Overmatch Initiative, 
how would you describe what this policy is? Do you perceive any difference in the 
Overmatch incentives if one is considering bus or bus-related projects versus rail 
modernization? 
Almost all respondents were acquainted with the Initiative and understood its intent. 
However, some felt it should apply only to rail projects. There were no perceived differences 
in the Initiative whether a new start, bus or modernization project was being considered. 
Several respondents, in fact, argued strongly that there should not be any difference between the 
three Tiers. Some example responses to this question are: 
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"Through an increased local share, limited Federal dollars can be extended to more 
grantees and to more projects. Also, the policy aims to increase competitiveness 
between grantees and their productivity; aims to encourage flexibility on the part of 
localities in terms of the way local match is developed; aims to encourage innovative 
funding. Among projects funded by discretionary monies, incentives are assumed to be 
the same." 
"This policy attempts to get grantees more involved in financing projects locally by 
increasing the local match requirement from the minimum 25 percent. It may be easier 
to attract private investors to rail, and new start projects, because of the "glamour" of 
these efforts" 
"The Overmatch Initiative separates the have's from the have-not's. It pits large, well-
fudned systems against smaller, less financially-able systems for a share of the shrinking 
Federal dollar." 
"Overmatch advances the a grant proposal when a match is in excess of 25 percent. 
The greater the local match, the higher priority the proposal will receive from UMTA. 
Bus related projects appear to be more difficult for which to obtain funding through 
overmatch." 
"Overmatch incentives are considered absolutely necessary in new starts and rail 
modernization." 
"The policy appears to establish a "bidding war" for discretionary transit funds." 
"The Overmatch Initiative is geared to stretching shrinking Federal dollars allocated to 
mass transit. Perceive that Overmatch incentives would be more necessary in new starts 
and rail modernization than bus-related projects." 
"UMTA appears to concentrate on new start projects in this policy" 
"We see it as a misguided public policy to reward the rich at the exclusion of good 
projects." 
"It's a policy to encourage a higher local jurisdiction financial participation than before. 
Rail projects are typically more capital intensive with lower operating costs than bus. 
Overmatch should not apply to bus." 
"Policy is intended to leverage as much non-Federal investment in transit capital projects 
as possible by according priority to overmatched projects in discretionary funding 










FIGURE 6. REASONS FOR OVERMATCH, UMTA OVERMATCH SURVEY 
A - because agency needs the extra federal money. 
B because agency wanted to gain a competitive edge. 
C 	because agency wanted greater flexibility. 
D because private sector willing to provide funds. 
E because agency wanted to reduce level of federal 
funding/involvement. 
FIGURE 14—REASONS FOR OVERMATCH 
What, in general, is your assessment of the Overmatch Initiative? 
It is generally felt the Initiative is biased on behalf of larger and financially secure 
municipalities. Although many agencies felt strongly that the Initiative was not good policy, 
several did think it was a sound strategy for securing local investment. Many respondents, 
however, agree that the implementation of the Initiative has been poor. Excerpts from the 
answers to this question include: 
"It is a good policy assuming there are fewer "Federal strings" attached." 
"We are concerned that the preference for private over public overmatch contributions 
will arbitrarily favor wealthy commercial districts. If the goal is the lowest net project 
cost, then any distinctions are not appropriate and counter-productive in creating viable 
financing plans. We have similar concerns regarding distinctions between in-kind and 
cash contributions." 
"An effective way to transition transit properties towards a reduced dependence on 
Federal funds." 
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"It has been effective in leveraging Federal dollars further than in the past and in 
encouraging grantees to commit more local funds to their transportation projects." 
"Effectively provides grants to highest bidder but may reduce the number of new grant 
requests." 
"Read my lips---raise local taxes" 
The overmatch policy is unfair and does not recognize variations in funding schemes and 
formulas from state to state. Basically, those systems with dedicated funding stand a 
better chance of providing an overmatch and receive funding." 
"Tends to favor areas with healthy economies which can afford large local 
commitments. From UMTA's viewpoint, it does stretch Federal funds and may induce 
greater local investment. Overall, it is a worthwhile intitiative, so long as poorer aeras 
can still get their minimum needs met." 
"The Initiative is an inappropriate application of the "survival of the fittest" business 
philosophy to a public service that is established to promote the general welfare of the 
people. A system is able to overmatch Federal funds would appear to have excess local 
funds and should not be given priority over the poorer systems that need the Federal 
funding." 
"It can be helpful, yet realistically, it may not be a long-term solution. Different states 
have different political subdivisions on transit and can be adversely affected. Also, 
states can't always afford funding the overmatch due to fiscal constraints." 
Have you generated activity as a result of the New Starts Overmatch Policy or has 
your agency generally adopted such a policy all alone? 
Forty three percent of the transit agencies did not answer this question or had no opinion. 
Only 5 percent claimed to have generated activity as a result of the Overmatch provisions of the 
New Starts Policy. The remaining 52 percent initiated projects without considering overmatch. 
However, of these transit agencies, 23 indicated a strong interest in how to generate an 
overmatch. Therefore, the results suggest many agencies do not know appropriate ways of 
applying for overmatch or of generating overmatch funds. 
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What changes in the Overmatch policy would you recommend? 
Responses to this question were sharply divided. In order of frequency, the proposed 
changes are as follows: 
• no changes (21 percent) 
• eliminate the program (18 percent) 
• set a standard match (9 percent) 
• consider current commitment to mass transit (6 percent) 
• reduce competition among agencies (6 percent) 
Other suggestions included: provide a clearer policy statement, provide a definitive review 
process tied to percentages, ensure that requirements are consistent with the amount of funding 
that is available, fund only those projects that are recommended by AA/DEIS, set a visible 
"mark" level, offer more guidance and promulgation, apply overmatch only to programmatic 
overmatches, decrease increments used to evaluate projects, expand definition of "UMTA 
project," remove the requirement that funds must already be in place, promote competition only 
among similar projects, and consider need. 
Do you think the Overmatch policy is equitable? Why or why not? 
Approximately 19 percent of the respondents feel the policy is equitable, while 56 percent 
feel it is not. This response is related to the perception that only wealthier municipalities benefit 
from the policy (see Figure 15). 
Do you think the Overmatch policy is efficient? Why or why not? 
Twenty-four percent of respondents feel the policy is efficient, while 33 percent feel it is 
not. The most common response was that the policy did not result in the efficient selection of 
projects (see Figure 16). 
What kind of incentive can be added to encourage use of the Overmatch Initiative? 
Again, opinion on this question was s.aarply divided. The most common responses are as 
follows: 
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FIGURE 15-EQUITY OF OVERMATCH POLICY 
PEROENT YES 
41 .67% 
FIGURE 16-EFFICIENCY OF OVERMATCH POLICY 
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• not possible to add any incentives to encourage use of overmatch (24 percent) 
• streamline the process (17 percent) 
• give overmatch projects greater priority in the ranking system (7 percent) 
o expand the definition of "UMTA project" (7 percent) 
Other recommendations include: providing a more standardized application of overmatch 
funds, reducing the amount of Federal non-monetary involvement, speeding up the funding 
process, providing a clearer definition of objectives, increasing the amount of operating 
assistance from UMTA, reducing the funding increments, encouraging competition only after 
Section 3 money has been equally distributed among the states, offering grant awards, allowing 
incentives to develop naturally as federal funding becomes more scarce, using overall capital 
expenditures as a basis for the decision, adopting a formula base, and guaranteeing funding for 
a specific level of overmatch. 
What problems have you encountered in implementing the Overmatch policy? 
Thirty-five percent of the agencies that answered this question have had no problems with 
the implementation of overmatch. Another 35 percent of the agencies have encountered 
difficulty in finding the money to provide an overmatch. Thirteen percent of the agencies report 
that the process lacks definition and can be confusing. Other problems include: slow review 
of AA/DEIS, Federal role in Federal projects not dominant, artificial division of budget and 
accounting to create an acceptable project, and a bias for rail projects. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The responses to the survey reflect diverse opinions about the Overmatch policy. The 
perceptions that were identified in the preliminary phase of the project were confirmed through 
the survey of the agencies. Agencies do not, in fact, appear to have good information on what 
is required of the local overmatch and the local match is frequently met through "soft match". 
This is particularly true for the private sector contributions. Lastly, there is some indication that 
those local areas able to do so would overmatch anyway to achieve greater flexibility and 
minimize Federal government involvement. 
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Overmatch funding is originating almost equally at the State, regional and local level with 
some occurrence in special districts and from private sector contributions. At the State level, 
over 50 percent of the matches are in the form of cash while this is less true at the regional and 
local level. The form of match for the private sector is mainly in-kind and donated facilities. 
Private sector/developers were the largest source of overmatch share at the lcoal level. Of 
those answering the question, non-governmental groups played a more important role in 
intitiating the overmatch offer. 
The majority of respondents, 56 percent, are not providing overmatch. Of those doing so, 
the majority are using overmatch because of the competitive edge in the funding process and to 
reduce Federal funding/involvement. Only 22 percent of respondents consider total system costs 
during the planning process. 
The intent of the Overmatch policy was reasonably well understood. However, there was 
speculation that the intent was not being accomplished adequately. It is generally felt that the 
policy is biased on behalf of larger, wealthier cities and it is therefore not equitable. 
Respondents also indicated that the policy does not result in more efficient project selection. 
Only a small percentage of respondents have generated activity as a result of the Overmatch 
Policy. The majority of respondents, 52 percent, did include a larger local share without 
considering the official Policy. As might be expected, approximately 35 percent of the 
respondents indicated that their major problem was an inability to generate additional funds to 
provide an overmatch. 
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_CASE INVESTIGATIONS OF SIX METROPOLITAN TRANSIT 
SYSTEMS 
The results of the national survey, and conversations with UMTA officials, led to the 
identification of six transit systems or metropolitan areas that could seemingly provide interesting 
insights into the dynamics of the Overmatch Initiative. These transit systems or metropolitan 
areas were Atlanta, Baltimore, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. As noted 
in the opening section of this report, each of these cases was chosen for a special reason. 
Atlanta was chosen for its successful pursuit of Federal funds in the expansion of the MARTA 
system, which included local overmatch provisions. Baltimore was selected because of the 
construction of an extensive light rail line through the region which was to be funded primarily 
by non-Federal funds. Denver was included because it did not have an official Overmatch 
project, but was definitely trying to participate in the program. Houston was an important site 
because of a promised private sector contribution toward the construction of a light rail line. 
Los Angeles was included because it was the first major investment project which include an 
overmatch in its full funding agreement with UMTA. In addition, the private sector contribution 
which was to occur through benefit assessments became embroiled in legal challenges and thus 
shows 7the uncertainties that can be associated with a diverse range of local funding sources. 
San Francisco proposed a regional rail plan consisting of numerous rail facilities, each having 
differing Federal shares, but in total having a very low overall Federal participation. 
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MARTA'S AGGRESSIVE EXPANSION OF THE TRANSIT SYSTEM 
Ever since a 1971 referendum provided local sales tax revenues from Fulton and DeKalb 
counties, the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) has been aggressively 
building and expanding one of the nation's newest and most effective rapid transit systems. 
Much of this expansion has been funded with local funds. As such, MARTA becomes an 
important case for this research. 
Background 
Atlanta has developed one of the nation's finest mass transit systems in the country. The 
two most populous counties in the region, Fulton and DeKalb, are served by the MARTA whose 
36 mile subway system and fleet of over 800 buses provide excellent public transportation 
service in the metropolitan core. The long-range plan for the MARTA system includes 60 miles 
of rail with 45 stations, consisting of five rail branches. The subway system has received strong 
support from public officals and from the business sector, which has viewed the system as a way 
of maximizing development opportunities in the region. The excellent service provided by the 
region's transportation system was repeatedly pointed to by several officials interviewed for this 
case study. Mr. George Berry, Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Industry, Trade, 
and Tourism said that "Atlanta is now experiencing the best level of mobility it has for a long 
time due to a combination of MARTA and freeway expansion." Mr. Jerry Bartels, Executive 
Director of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce argued that the excellent transportation system 
contributed to Atlanta's image as a growing, progressive city. He stated that "transportation is 
a major selling point for Atlanta----the airport is most important, followed by the freeway 
system, MARTA, and the rail system." In addition, Mr. Bartels stated that the recent choice 
of Atlanta to host the 1996 Olympics was in part influenced by the excellent transportation 
infrastructure in place in Atlanta. MARTA officials played an important role in providing a 
strong transit plan for the Olympics. Mr. Floyd Hardy, Deputy Commissioner of the Georgia 
Department of Transportation agreed that the excellent transportation system has given a very 
positive image to the city. He noted that "access to the central business district via transit or 
freeway is better than ever before." He attributed this to the foresight of local officials in 
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anticipating future problems and putting in place the necessary transportation infrastructure to 
deal with them. Dan Sweat, President of the Central Atlanta Progress (at the time of the 
interview) and Houshang Farhadi, Director of Planning at John Portman and Associates, one of 
Atlanta's largest developers, agreed that the regional transportation system keeping pace with 
growth has been an important component of the region's phenomenal growth over the past 
several years. 
In summary, the Atlanta region has experienced rapid growth over the past ten years and 
is expecting even more over the next 20. A regional rail system has been put in place that 
serves the transportation needs of the fast-growing region. Both public officials and private 
sector representatives acknowledge the important role that the excellent transportation system 
has had in supporting this growth. 
Funding 
The MARTA system expansion was one of two systems that received a "high" rating for 
capital overmatch in the 1985 UMTA 'New Starts' evaluation. This rating was symptomatic of 
the financing strategy adopted by MARTA for expanding the base rail system. In several 
instances, as will be seen below, MARTA made an explicit decision to use local funds, in place 
of, Federal funds to expedite rail project construction. MARTA officials identified eight projects 
that have been in some phase of project development since the 1984 New Starts policy. These 
projects, along with the funding shares are: 
Project Title 
College Park Segment/Station 
Chamblee Segment/Station 
South Yard and Shops 
Project Stage 	 Project Cost 
Open 6/88 	 Total: $111.85 M 
Federal: 5.2% 
Local: 94.8% 
Open 12/87 	 Total: $131.6 M 
Federal: 20.3% 
State: 79.9% 




Airport Segment/Station 	Open 	 Total: $43.4 M 
Federal: 53.9% 
State: 46.1% 
Doraville Segment/Station 	Construction 	 Total: $126.7 M 
Federal: 63.3% 
State: 36.7% 
East Line Extension 	 Construction 	 Total: $170.7 M 
Federal: 68.8% 
Local: 31.2% 
Bankhead Segment/Station 	Construction 	 Total: $48.9 M 
Federal: 0% 
State: 100% 
North Atlanta Corridor 	Construction 	 Total: $717 M 
Alts. Analysis Federal: 52.2% 
State: 48.8% 
The high levels of local funding were, in essence, strategies of necessity. MARTA was 
unable to obtain a full-funding contract for the entire expansion that is represented in the above 
eight projects. MARTA therefore had to rely on Letter of No Prejudice and annual 
Congressional appropriations. It was found that this style of project funding caused delays and 
associated costs due to inflation. To maintain the construction schedule, MARTA decided to 
use a greater share of local funds. The Bankhead project stands out as having 100% local funds. 
This funding approach was adopted because MARTA officials did not feel that the project would 
have been competitive for Federal funds. The final project, currently underway, was started 
with local funds because it is being built in conjunction with a state highway and thus could not 
be delayed. 
The funding source for this local capital is a dedicated one percent sales tax passed in 1971 
in Fulton and DeKalb Counties. Although a recent slowdown in the metropolitan economy has 
slowed the pace of sales tax revenues to MARTA (and was the reason for a fare increase in 
1990), it is expected that the sales tax revenues will be the predominant local source of funds 
well into the 21st Century. In the last project listed above, right of way and land donations have 
been proposed by local developers in exchange for access to proposed stations. In addition, 
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under State law, local property owners can form a Community Improvement District which 
allows additional taxes to be raised and dedicated for some special purpose. Such a District was 
being proposed by a group of developers and MARTA officials contacted them to see if the new 
subway extension could be a beneficiary of some of these funds. An estimated $10 million could 
be provided to the project. 
Overmatch Initiative 
MARTA was one of the few agencies that identified specific funding activities that could be 
related to the Overmatch Initiative, these being the pursuit of private funding as part of the 
North Line extension. However, even with this response to the Initiative and given that 
MARTA had provided larger-than-required local shares before, MARTA officials still had some 
serious concerns with the UMTA policy. MARTA officials expressed concern with a perceived 
UMTA preference for private over public overmatch contributions. The consequence of this 
preference, according to MARTA officials, would be a favoring of wealthy commercial districts 
over poorer areas. If the goal is lowest net project cost, there should not be any preference 
given to the sources of funds. To do otherwise creates unnecessary complications in developing 
financing plans. Similarly, MARTA officials disagreed with the distinction between in-kind and 
cash contributions. Obtaining land contributions is often the easiest way and, in MARTA's 
experience, the only feasible way to secure private contributions for a project. In addition, if 
the in-kind contribution offsets a real cost of a project, then why should it count any less than 
any other contribution which reduces the net project cost? The final observation from MARTA 
officials was a question of why transit seems to have been singled out of all Federal programs 
for variable local matching requirements. 
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BALTIMORE CENTRAL LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT PROJECT 
The Baltimore Central Light Rail Project provides an illustration of an ambitious, four-
staged strategy to construct a 27-mile light rail system through the Baltimore region. Local 
transit officials state that project development was considered in light of the Overmatch policy 
to obtain expedited Federal review of documentation. As such, the Baltimore case shows how 
the Overmatch policy was designed to work. 
Background 
The Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MTA) construct I and opened to operation 
Baltimore's first heavy rail line during the 1980's. This subway was the product of the 
normal UMTA project review process with an 80% Federal match, A six-mile, $160 million 
extension of this subway opened in 1987, a project that was funded 'ith Interstate transfer funds 
at an 85% Federal participation. Another extension is to open 1994; again funded with 
Interstate transfer funds at an 85 % Federal matching ratio. 
A light rail line through the central Baltimore region had been proposed by transit advocates 
for many years. In 1987, a feasibility study showed that such a transit line did make sense. The 
Govei-Aor subsequently proposed such an undertaking to the Legislature in 1988 and received 
Legislative approval that same year. The MTA did not submit the project proposal to UMTA 
because such a submittal was expected to result in long time c -' ..ays in obtaining Federal 
approval. 
The Central Light Rail Transit project extends 27 miles through the center of the Baltimore 
region and has a total of 37 stations (see Figure 17). The project has been divided into four 
segments: a 21-mile Central segment which is located entirely witl ithe City of Baltimore, a 
two-mile South segment which extends from the city boundaries to terminals in Anne Arundel 
County, a four-mile North segment which extends from the city boundaries to terminals at Hunt 
Valley in Baltimore County, and a one-half mile extension to Penn Station in central Baltimore. 
The alignment will be located primarily within existing railroad right-of-way except at BWI 
Airport, in downtown Baltimore, and in the Hunt Valley business community. The final system 
is estimated to have a daily ridership of 33,100 people. 
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Figure 17—Baltimore's Central Light Rail Project 
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The Central segment is currently under construction with one-half of the line expected to be 
open in May, 1992. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the North segment is 
finished with an expected line opening of late 1992. Both the South segment and the Penn 
Station extension are in the latter part of the Alternatives Analysis/DEIS stage and are expected 
to open in 1993. As can be seen in these target dates, the MTA has established an ambitious 
schedule for implementing this light rail line. If these dates are held, the entire line consisting 
of four separate projects, will have been completed in only six years. 
Funding 
The funding distribution for these four projects is shown in Table 13. Note that although 
three of the projects use a 75% Federal share, the biggest project costing $364 million was 
funded without Federal funds. The net result for the entire project is a Federal share of 60.5 
million out of a $464 million project, or a 13.25% Federal share. Approximately $340 million 
of the state/local share will come from the State Transportation Trust Fund which consists of 
revenues collected from all sources of transportation fees and taxes, e.g., road tolls, vehicle 
registration fees, gasoline taxes, transit fares, etc. This Transportation Trust Fund is used to 
fund all capital, operating, and maintenance expenses for transportation systems across the state. 
Each modal agency in the State department of transportation presents each year a separate modal 
budget to the Secretary's Office which then develops a comprehensive DOT budget across all 
modes. 
In addition to the State funding, three local jurisdictions are for the first time contributing 
non-Transportation Trust Fund revenues to a public transportation project. Some small 
contributions to station construction costs are expected from the private sector. One local 
developer has committed close to $300,000 toward construction costs for a station that abuts 
their property. MTA officials stated that the most likely private sector contribution to the transit 
system will be to lease or rent MTA space, thus providing operating income to the agency. 
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Central Segment Under Construction 
Half Open in 1992 
$364 M 
0% Fed Share 
North Segment Open Late 1992 $47 M 
75% Fed Share 
South Segment Open 1993 $24 M 
75% Fed Share 
Penn Station Ext. Open 1993 $11 M 
75% Fed Share 
Total Cost $464 M 
Federal Share ($) $61.5 M 
Federal Share (%) 13.25% 
Overmatch Policy 
MTA officials expressed great satisfaction with the way the Overmatch policy is being 
implemented in the Central Light Rail project. The MTA has experienced faster-than-expected 
UMTA review of MTA documentation which is attributed to the Overmatch Policy. UMTA 
Administrator Dellibovi sent a letter to the MTA saying that UMTA would, in fact, expedite the 
review of the AA/DEIS's for the three projects subject to Federal oversight. MTA officials feel 
that this commitment is being met. Overall, although Baltimore has had a favorable experience 
with the Overmatch Policy, MTA officials are still unclear how important the Overmatch is, or 
should be, when facing a situation where one clearly superior project competes with a project 
that provides a better local financial commitment. 
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DENVER REGIONAL TRANSPU - .TATION DISTRICT 
At the time of the interview, Denver had not received approval f m UMTA to proceed with 
Alternatives Analysis or to fund a new start project with Federal participation. This case study 
was included in the analysis because it represents the "non-participants" in the Overmatch policy. 
Background 
The Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD) has been embroiled for many years in 
local controversy over the appropriate direction of transit policy in the Denver metropolitan area. 
A disagreement over the type of transit system, and for that matter the institutional structure for 
managing the entire metropolitan area's transportation system, has been debated extensively over 
the past ten years. In the midst of this debate, the RTD has proposed to construct some high 
capacity facilities and to study others. The RTD has three projects that it considers fits into the 
Overmatch policy category. The first is an HOV lane in the North Corridor which is expected 
to be open in 1992. The project cost of $200 million is split 35% Federal and 65% local. 
Because of the construction of a new airport to the northeast, a feasibility study is currently 
underway to construct a rail connector from downtown to the new airport. This project, if 
constructed and opened in 1994, is expected to cost about $210 million, with no Federal 
participation. The final projects are two Alternatives Analyses in the Southeast and Southwest 
corridors. The RTD told UMTA officials that these latter two Alternatives Analyses could be 
part of an Overmatch project with Federal participation somewhere i the range of 25 % to 35%. 
This low level of Federal participation was designed to obtain UMTA approval to conduct two 
Alternatives Analyses at the same time. Approval was not given. 
Funding 
The three projects described above are to receive funding from stweral funding sources. Of 
course, without knowing the exact nature of the preferred alter atives if the Alternatives 
Analyses were, in fact, conducted, one cannot say that these fundi ; sources are sufficient to 
provide the required local match. The State will contribute $69 million from a highway fund 
program, the City of Denver will contribute $23 million from general revenues, and the RTD 
will contribute $38 million from a dedicated local sales tax. In addition, the State Legislature 
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has provided local communities with the capability to collect a number of taxes: 
1. A maximum assessment of $0.40 per square foot per year from all businesses 
occupying 10,000 or more square feet of space is allowed under current 
legislation. The actual current assessment is maintained at $0.10 per square foot 
per year. This will likely increase if and when a project is approved for 
construction. 
2. A maximum head tax of $2.00 per employee per year charged to both employees 
and employers, excluding businesses such as hospitals. This is currently not 
collected. 
3. Value capture provisions may be instituted along the corridor. 
4. Other possible tax sources include leasing, telephone and hotel taxes, one of which 
have yet been implemented. 
It is expected that special taxing districts, one which already exists at the Denver Technology 
Center, would also be asked to participate. 
Overmatch Policy 
RTD officials, at the time of the interview (April 1990), questioned whether there was an 
official Overmatch Policy. Repeated inquiries to the UMTA Regional Office suggested that 
there was such a policy, but that nothing could be determined until the policy guidelines were 
received. This uncertainty created some problems for RTD in that funding agreements with the 
City and State were negotiated with the understanding that an Overmatch policy would in fact 
be in place. Perhaps because of the uncertainty associated with the definition and scope of an 
Overmatch policy, RTD officials were somewhat more negative about the prospects and 
implications of the Overmatch policy on national transit policy„ There was a feeling that the 
policy is not equitable in that "richer" communities would be able to "buy" Federal support more 
easily than communities with lesser means. Although the Overmatch policy was designed to 
expedite project approval, there was some feeling that the different funding sources that are often 
needed to provide an Overmatch package often complicates bookkeeping and makes final funded 
amounts somewhat less certain, and therefore more risky. The RTD also felt that the language 
associated with an Overmatch policy should clearly define the benefits to the local communities 
of adopting such an approach. 
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HOUSTON METRO'S LIGHT RAIL LINE 
The Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County (Houston Metro) is constructing an 
impressive system of regional HOV lanes that will connect the entire region to the major activity 
centers in the metropolitan area. As part of the Metro strategy, a light rail line (known as the 
"System Connector") was to be built connecting the downtown to major activity centers in the 
urban core. The System Connector became the focus of intense local debate and still today the 
decision has not been made to proceed with some form of rail line. This debate, and the 
provision of substantial private sector funding, make the Houston case an important case 
investigation for this research. 
Background 
In August, 1978, by a 60 percent majority, the voters of Harris County created the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County (METRO) and funded it with a one percent 
sales tax. A transit plan had been presented to the voters which included radial transitways, 
park-and-ride lots, bus vehicles and facilities, and consideration of "automated guideway or rail 
transit". In response to this favorable vote, METRO developed a proposal that included a $1.4 
billion, 18.2-mile heavy rail system. This proposal was rejected in a referendum in 1983. After 
a two-year restudy of the future of transit in Houston, the METRO Board adopted a Regional 
Transit Plan in 1986 that included many of the same proposals as the previous plan, but this time 
included a rail system connector that was to connect downtown Houston with three major activity 
centers nearby (see Figure 18), and a general mobility program that was to be funded with 25 
percent of the METRO's sales tax revenues. 
The System Connector was taken into a formal Alternatives Analysis process and a locally 
preferred alternative had been selected. However, in 1989 the METRO Board, in response to 
several national reports that cast doubt on transit ridership and cost forecasting approaches, 
decided to reexamine the System Connector proposal. This reexamination resulted in a very 
controversial METRO Board decision to not build a rail System Connector, a decision that was 
overturned shortly thereafter when a new Board chairman was appointed by the mayor of 
Houston. However, enough criticism of the original System Connector proposal had surfaced 
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Figure 18—Houston's System Connector 
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from this review that METRO decided to once again look at different System Connector 
configurations. METRO is under some pressure to identify a locally preferred alternative having 
general consensus before Spring, 1991. The funds for this rail proposal have been "set aside" 
in Congressional appropriations, and if an acceptable proposal is not identified by then, local 
officials fear that these funds might disappear, 
Funding 
METRO has entered into overmatch agreements with UMTA or projects that were initiated 
even before the New Starts policy. However, all of these projects were the result of 
Congressional "earmarks", that is, specific Congressional directions to UMTA to fund certain 
projects. These projects have included: 
Project 	 Project Stage 	 Funding--UMTA 
State 
METRO 
Northwest 	 Complete 	 $67 M (64%) 
Transitway $7 M (7%) 
$30 M (29%) 
Southwest 	 Construction 	 $64 M (66%) 
Transitway $15 M (15%) 
$19 M (19%) 
North 	 Design 	 $49 M (68%) 
Freeway $22 M (32%) 
Transitway 
Mission Bend 	 Design 	 $3.7 M (54%) 
Park & Ride $3.2 M (46%) 
METRO expects to receive half of the $1.4 billion needed to 1 iild the System Connector 
from the Federal government. The remaining local portion was tc be supported mainly from 
the sales tax ($185 million in FY 1989), state funds, passenger rever :s and from private sector 
support. The total private sector contributions through FY 2000 were assumed to be $130 
million in constant 1988 dollars. This private sector contribution as to be obtained through 
assessment districts, voluntary contributions, and land donations. METRO staff conducted 
numerous financing scenario analyses to gauge the risk to the Authority and its other services 
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of different System Connector configurations. An example of such a scenario analysis is shown 
in Figure 19. Note in this Figure that the bottom line issue to METRO was the net change in 
its retained earnings. Through such an analysis, METRO was able to determine that several 
proposed System Connector alternatives did not meet a financial solvency test for METRO itself. 
The use of private sector contributions in the financing of the System Connector presented 
several challenges to its evaluation. The most important issue was in what form and at what 
magnitude was this contribution to be made. The $130 million contribution as a figure that had 
been arrived at through negotiations between a key METRO official and key business 
representatives. No one, however, knew what this contribution meant, was it donations? cash 
contributions? In addition, subsequent to the agreement on $130 million, several private sector 
representatives mentioned publicly that their understanding of this contribution was that it was 
not estimated in constant dollars. As noted by one representative, whenever the rail system was 
opened, $130 million was to be contributed. METRO officials, on the other hand, argued that 
the $130 million contribution was, in fact, in constant dollars so that when the contribution was 
due, it would have to be inflated. This issue apparently has not yet been decided. 
METRO has issued an RFP for the overall project management of the System Connector 
project and included in the RFP a requirement for the successful firm to assure a minimum $130 
million contribution from the private sector. At least one responding firm to the RFP claimed 
that this level of private sector donations would be fairly easy to obtain through right-of-way 
donations, lease arrangements, and assessment districts. However, no firm commitment was 
made in guaranteeing this level of contribution. 
Overmatch Policy 
METRO officials generally supported the Overmatch Initiative because it "encouraged the 
leveraging of limited Federal transportation funds by giving those projects with substantial local 
financial commitments funding priority." Although METRO has not officially participated in 
UMTA's Overmatch program, it was METRO officials' opinion that one of the reasons why 
Congress was willing to earmark funds for the Houston system was a significant greater local 
contribution to the overall cost of the projects. 
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LOS ANGELES METRO RAIL 
The Los Angeles Metro Rail system is one of the most ambitious rail construction projects 
in the country today. Not only does it represent a substantial allocation of public funds to 
retrofit a rail system into what is considered the "freeway capital" of the U.S., but the funding 
strategy for the system includes a variety of federal, state and local sources which makes it a 
useful case study for this research. In addition, some of the local funding, that coming from 
benefit assessment districts surrounding Metro Rail stations, has been subject to legal action thus 
providing some indication of the controversies that may surround such funding strategies. 
Background 
In 1980, the voters of Los Angeles County passed Proposition A which authorized a one-half 
cent increase in the sales tax to fund mass transportation improvements. The proceeds of this 
tax are divided into three categories: 25% of the revenues go to cities in the county for 
transportation purposes, 35% goes to the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission to 
construct the Metro Rail system, and 40% is for discretionary purposes that is currently used 
to support bus operations. Proposition A became a major policy and funding source for a 150-
mile, regional rail rapid transit system that was developed in varying levels of detail in the early 
1980's. In 1983, a final environmental impact statement was published with a locally preferred 
alternative that was considered the starter line for the Metro Rail system. This starter line was 
an 18.6-mile heavy rail subway with 18 stations. A major portion of the funding for this starter 
line was to come from UMTA, 68.6% of the total estimated cost of $3.309 billion. The state 
was going to contribute $400 million, local governments $481 million, and $170 million was to 
come from revenue bonds that were based on special assessment district financing. 
The locally preferred alternative was not advanced into design because it was discovered that 
some segments of the alignment crossed areas where naturally-occurring methane gas was being 
produced. Congress passed a law which stipulated that Metro Rail's starter line could not be 
constructed in such risk areas, and further, the original locally preferred alternative had to be 
modified to find acceptable alternative alignments. In 1988, a new locally preferred alternative 
(now known as the Metro Red Line) was approved. The new alignment consisted of 17.4 miles 
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and 16 stations. The eleven-year construction project was to be undertaken in three stages--
minimum operatable segment 1 (MOS-1) to open in FK 1994; MOS-2 to open in FY 1999; and 
MOS-3 to open in FY 2001 (see Figure 20). MOS-1 is currently under construction. A funding 
agreement on MOS-2 was signed with UMTA in April, 1990. MOS-3 is in planning and in 
preliminary engineering. This new alignment is estimated to carry 298,000 riders per day 
(66,000 less than the first alternative) and cost $3.918 billion. In addition, transit planners 
argued that the new alignment provided better joint development potential near its proposed 
stations, increasing the estimated benefit assessment revenues from $85 million in the original 
alignment to $205 million with the new alignment. Some transit officials also argued that the 
new alignment strengthened local support for the rail system due to its now avoiding the methane 
risk areas and a realignment in a controversial segment along Wilshire Boulevard. 
In addition to the Metro Red Line, the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission is 
also building or planning to build other rail lines. The recently opened Blue Line from Long 
Beach to downtown Los Angeles was funded entirely with Proposition A funds. A Green Line, 
also funded entirely with Proposition A funds, will serve the El Segundo employment area with 
possible future extensions north and south along the coast. Figure 21 shows the rail transit plan 
for Los Angeles County as currently envisioned. 
An "institutional" characteristic of the Metro Rail system also merits some attention in this 
background section. As noted above, the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission 
(LACTC) is the local agency that receives the Proposition A funds to construct the rail system. 
The Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD), created in 1964, is the agency that 
operates the transit system. The SCRTD was the agency that initially developed the plans for 
the rail system. The division of responsibilities between both agencies for building the rail 
system, however, were not clear and often subject to political coalitions that could change with 
differing circumstances. Both the LACTC and the SCRTD were authorized by the Public 
Utilities Code to plan, design, and construct an exclusive public mass transit guideway system. 
The SCRTD was the UMTA grantee for the planning, design, and construction of MOS-1, but 
the LACTC was the grantee for MOS-2. Before signing a full funding agreement for MOS-2, 
UMTA insisted that some local agreement be reached on ultimate responsibility for MOS-2 and 
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Figure 20—Metro Rail Red Line 
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the Metro Red Line. In response, the LACTC and the SCRTD signed an agreement in January, 
1990 that defined the basic roles and responsibilities as follows: 
• The LACTC will be the policy making and authorizing agency for MOS-2. 
• A Rail Construction Corporation (RCC) will be responsible for the day-to-day 
management and decision-making for all rail construction projects. The RCC will 
consist of seven members, three appointed by the LACTC, three by the SCRTD, 
and the chairman appointed by the RCC Board. 
• The SCRTD will provide technical and support functions to LACTC for MOS-2, 
and will be the operator of all rail systems in the County. 
The importance of this agreement lies not only in understanding which agency has ultimate 
responsibility for Metro Rail planning, but also in the institutional arrangements for funding the 
system. The SCRTD was the agency originally authorized by the California legislature (S.B. 
1238) to establish special benefit assessment districts. Thus, the LACTC's financial plan for the 
County's rail system necessarily had to include some agreement with the SCRTD to use this 
benefit assessment authority to fund part of the rail system. The January agreement included 
the following language which dealt with this issue, "SCRTD agrees to establish beneift 
assessment districts and pay over to LACTC the net proceeds to the full extent allowed by law 
of all benefit assessment revenues which SCRTD collects as a result of establishing benefit 
assessment districts for the Metro Red Line Project." 
Funding 
The financial plan for the Metro Rail Red Line project is shown in Table 14. As can be 
seen in this Table, there are several sources of funds for this project. 
Local: The local revenues come from three major sources: the Proposition A funds 
administered by the LACTC, the City of Los Angeles (from its share of the 25% apportionment 
of Proposition A funds to County cities); and benefit assessment districts. The Proposition A 
funds were discussed previously and will thus not be discussed again. The benefit assessment 
funds, however, merit special attention because they are viewed by Los Angeles officials as 
clearly part of their Overmatch contribution. In 1983, the SCRTD was authorized by the state 
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This legislation allowed the SCRTD board, after public hearings, to estimate the benefit to a 
district from the operations of the local stations, levy assessments in proportion to those benefits, 
and issue bonds repayable through special assessments. The sole means to protest the creation 
of a special assessment district was be a referendum election, where only voters who were 
owners of real property were allowed to pa: ticipate. In 1985 the SCRTD Board passed a 
resolution to create two special assessment districts in downtown Los Angeles, with an initial 
rate of assessment of $0.30 per square foot of the greater of land or improvements and a 
maximum rate of $0.42 per square foot. Such assessments were to terminate in the year 2008. 
The resolution was submitted for approval to the Los Angeles City Council which approved it 
on the condition that all residential property within the districts be exempt from the assessment. 
The SCRTD Board accepted the proviso and in 1986 officially formed the two assessment 
districts. However, the creation of these assessment districts was challenged on the legal ground 
that the election appeal mechanism violated equal protection under the Constitution in that only 
TABLE 14—METRO RED LINE FINANCIAL PLAN 
Los Angeles Metro Bail Red Line Project 
Financial Plan 
Source: Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, 90 
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property owners were allowed to vote. In May, 1990, the California Court of Appeals agreed 
with this challenge and invalidated the state law which granted the SCRTD authorization to 
create assessment districts. Given the important role of benefit assessment revenues in the 
financing of the rail system, the SCRTD and the LACTC could not allow this source of funds 
to disappear. The SCRTD has appealed the Court's findings and the State Supreme Court has 
agreed to hear the case. 
State: The California Transportation Commission (CTC) administers the state's Transit 
Capital Improvement Program and the Fixed Guideway Program. Although the CTC's original 
commitment to Los Angeles's rail system was capped at $400 million, the CTC increased its 
commitment in 1989 to $515 million. This commitment was increased for several reasons. The 
CTC felt that local agencies had significantly increased their local share of the project cost, thus 
showing strong commitment to the rail line. The additional state funds would allow the LACTC 
to leverage additional rail construction in Los Angeles County through its use of Proposition A 
funds. Finally, Metro Rail had been continually identified as the Los Angeles County's highest 
priority over several years, and thus warranted higher state funding 
Several recent changes in state law also provide possible sources of new state funding. A 
law was recently passed which provides up to 50% state funding of rail construction costs, 
previously the limit was 20%. Los Angeles officials felt that this increased state share might 
not help them that much because other California cities will be competing for these funds. 
Financial Planning 
The LACTC has undertaken a major effort to develop financial plans for the construction 
and operation of the Metro Rail system. This planning has taken two forms that are of interest 
to this research project. 
Cost Overruns--One of the interesting aspects of the local funding for the Red Line was the 
distribution of additional costs that were identified after the full funding agreement with UMTA 
was signed. A 1990 financial plan for the Metro Red Line identified an increase of $473 million 
over a financial plan presented the year before. The Executive Director of the LACTC, in a 
letter to the Executive Director of the CTC, stated that this increase could be attributed to two 
basic factors: 
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1. An audit in late 1989 found $135 million in cost overruns for MOS-1. 
2. A one-year delay in signing federal commitments for Phase II of Metro Rail and a 
limited federal funding commitment which resulted in the creation a two-part Phase II 
(i.e., MOS-2 and MOS-3) resulted in $338 million in inflationary increases. 
The $135 million MOS- cost increase - d the $23 million MOS-2 cost increase willbe 
shared equally by the LACTC and the City of Los Angeles through their Proposition A funds. 
The LACTC expects that UMTA will share about 54% of the $315 million cost increase in 
MOS-3, with the LACTC and the City sharing equally the remaining portion. 
Long Term Financing--Figure 22 shows the funding shares fc the entire LACTC Metro 
Rail system. Figure 23 shows one estimate of the revenue and cost stream for the construction 
of the entire rail system. As can be seen in Figure 23, there are several "out" years where the 
expected revenues do not meet cost requirements. Because of these shortfall, the LACTC has 
been conducting long-term financial planning which explores the imp cations of different project 
scheduling and cost savings plans. One of the options under consideration, as stated in the 
LACTC Transit Financial Plan, was to "look to the communities along each line to help reduce 
the project costs to the Commission and/or raise additional revenues." Specific cost savings 
options include: accelerate construction of project lines, assume longer train ^eadways to 
decrease number of vehicles needed, reduce number of stations, conduct value engineering, City 
financing of some construction through bonding or other revenue sources. 
Overmatch Policy 
The Los Angeles Metro Rail system was one of the first rail investments in the country to 
use an overmatch contribution to attract federal funds. According to LACTC officials, the 
overmatch for MOS-1 and MOS-2 was deemed necessary to convince UMTA that the rail 
projects were worthy and to avoid antagonizing other transit properties around the country who 
were also competing for capital funds. The shear size of investment commitment dictated a 
higher-than-required local share. For example, $557.1 million of the $1.446 billion project cost 
for MOS-2 is listed in local share as overmatch. For MOS-3, which is still in planning and 
early design stages and for which there is no UMTA funding agreement, the preliminary 
financing figures show an ap, .oximate $127 million overmatch co iitment. In all three 
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operating segments, LACTC officials said that it was assumed a 50% federal contribution was 
reasonable. The 46.1 % federal share for MOS-2 is the result of cost increases which have been 
covered with local funds, thus reducing the overall federal share for this project. The 63.3% 
federal share for MOS-3 represents additional costs associated with delays in reaching agreement 
on the MOS-2 and MOS-3 projects. In addition, this federal share should be considered only 
an estimate given that there is no UMTA commitment to MOS-3 at this time. 
LACTC officials also used the provision of overmatch for attracting federal participation as 
an argument to the CTC for obtaining additional state funds. The CTC had commited $115 
million to the construction of MOS-3, but CTC staff were questioning whether this level of 
funding should be reduced given a higher-than-fifty-percent assumed federal share. In response, 
LACTC argued, for several reasons, that this state commitment should remain. One of the 
reasons listed was that "an attractive balance of federal, state, local, and private sector financial 
commitments can be offered in support of the project as it competes with other projects for 
federal funds nationwide." In other words, the $115 million was needed to allow LACTC to 
provide an overmatch incentive for federal funds. 
LACTC feels the overmatch policy has been advantageous to Los Angeles, even though 
LACTC officials do not know what the exact policy is. They have not seen any guidance on 
what it officially is supposed to be, nor has the UMTA regional office been able to explain what 
is entailed. An example of how this lack of a written policy has affected LACTC can be found 
in the current construction of tunnels for MOS-2. LACTC determined that cost savings could 
occur to the overall project if tunnel construction for MOS-2 could be continued on segments 
that adjoin with the MOS-3 alignment. UMTA's regional office responded that such 
construction was not allowed given that MOS-3 was not an official UMTA project, but suggested 
that local funds be used to construct the tunnels and that if MOS-3 became a federal project, 
these sunk costs could be considered part of the local overmatch. When asked how to do this 
officially, the UMTA regional office did not know. 
LACTC officials did argue forcefully that UMTA needs to be concerned about long-
range financial planning. Such planning has been undertaken by LACTC and has indicated 
financial problems in later years, if nothing is done now to provide for sufficient funds. 
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Although such planning often goes beyond the boundaries of the official "federal project", 
LACTC feels that UMTA should be concerned about local financing capability to fund the 
ultimate system given that such capability will surely affect the local ability to operate the project 
that is built. This use, and concern for, long-term financial planning is perhaps the most 
important observation that surfaces from the Los Angeles case study. Although not directly 
related to the source of overmatch funds, certainly the uncertainty associated with local funding 
sources (like benefit assessments) should indicate the need for such long-term planning and 
contingency analysis. 
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THE BAY AREA'S REGIONAL TRANSIT PACKAGE 
The San Francisco Bay Area has adopted a wide-ranging transit investment plan that is 
designed to take the Bay Area into the 21st Century. The plan requires over $3.3 billion to 
implement and consists of six major projects. In an attempt to provide an incentive for Federal 
funds, these six projects are being presented as a package. Because of this "package deal" 
approach in responding to the Overmatch policy, the Bay Area was chosen for more detailed 
analysis in this research project. 
Background 
Rail transit has played an important transportation role in the Bay area. The opening of the 
Bay Area Rapid Transportation (BART) system in the mid-1970's was intended to be the 
beginning of an ambitious region-wide rail system that interconnected the nine counties in the 
metropolitan area. However, the plan actually adopted by the voters in 1962 only included the 
three core counties. Recognizing the problems caused by this reduced regional rail system, the 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the metropolitan planning organization for the Bay 
area and the agency responsible for approving transit capital investments, began a process in the 
early 1980's which resulted in the publication in 1984 of an interim plan which showed new 
potential rail lines in the region. In 1988, the MTC adopted Resolution No. 1876 which outlined 
how these new rail lines were to be funded. Importantly, this Resolution provided the means 
by which another county would join the BART system. 
This rail plan would extend BART to San Francisco Airport, provide for BART line 
extension in three directions, extend a commuter rail line closer to downtown, and extend a light 
rail line in Santa Clara County. The projects and cost sharing are shown below. 
Project 
BART Extension to Airport 
BART Extension to West Pittsburg 
BART Extension to Dublin 
Project Cost 
$878 M 
75% Fed Share 
$425 M 
0% Fed Share 
$514 M 
0% Fed Share 
80 
BART Extension to Warm Springs 	 $521 M 
0% Fed Share 
Commuter Rail Extension 	 $658 M 
25% Fed Share 
Light Rail Extension 	 $350 M 
50% Fed Share 
Totals 	 $3.346 B 
Federal Share ($) 	 $1.000 B 
Federal Share (%) 29.88% 
The less-than-30% total Federal share is not coincidental. MTC officials believed, according 
to an announcement in the Federal Register, that UMTA had commited to expedited processing 
of documentation for those funding requests which had less than a 30% Federal share. This 
expedited handling was to mean a six-month turnaround time rather than the average 18-month 
turnaround for initial funding proposals. The MTC sent a letter to Secretary Skinner 
emphasizing the size of the local commitment and suggesting that such commitment was in 
substantial conformance with the intent of the Overmatch policy. 
Funding 
The funding formula for each of the six above projects was spelled out in Resolution 1876 
which makes the funding commitment fairly firm. The funding sources for the specific projects 
are shown in Table 15. The local (non-state) funding share is derived from both old and new 
county sales taxes dedicated to transit, BART reserves, old and new bridge tolls, and Santa Clara 
light rail funds. The state will contribute $736 million out of state dedicated transit funds and 
rail bond funding that was approved by California voters in referendums 108, 111, and 116 of 
1990. There is not expected to be substantial funding from the private sector although BART 
is searching for joint development opportunities around some BART stations. 
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Overmatch Policy 
The MTC has adopted the Overmatch policy as part of its strategy for obtaining Federal aid 
for the proposed rail plan. As noted earlier, a letter was sent to Secretary Skinner in this regard 
by the Executive Director of MTC. At the time of the interview, MTC officials had not heard 
any information that made them believe the Overmatch policy was actually going to be 
implemented. Without specific UMTA action, MTC officials felt there was little basis for 
determining the effectiveness or equity implications of the policy. There was a feeling that if 
some grants were actually awarded on the basis of an Overmatch, local agencies would be placed 
in a better position to respond in ways that meet UMTA's objectives. 
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TABLE 15-PROPOSED PROJECT FUNDING AND SOURCES . 
RTIP FUNDING ASSUMPTION: Three SCA1 Bond issues Pass, No PCL 
State TCI 109'(11) .. 27 63 78 277 
SCA1 Rail Bond (Co. Min.) 11 19) 22 '(4) 
SCA1 Rail Bona (Discretion) 18'(9) - 35 127 .180 66 426 
Federal 165 660 175'14) 1000 
Subtotal 194 769 62 190'(10) 258 '110) 263 1735 
)Co sts   	658 878 425'(8) 514 18) 521 '(81 3-50 18 ) 33461 18) 
(1) Revenues have been revised downward from $170 million in '86$ to $147.5 million in138.S. The Authority is currently reevaluating the latter figure. 
(2) Per the provisions of SB1715, the Eastern Contra Costa extension shall receive $425 million (87$), including $34 million trom BAT and $74 million from SM. 
(3) The local share of this project is $173 million (87$) per Resolution 1876, escalated according to its construction schedule. 
Each county's share is subject to an agreement between San Francisco. San Mateo, and Santa Clara counties. 
(4) The Tasman project is funded 50% Federal and 50% State and Local sources. 
(5) Tolls from Regional Measure I will raise $7 million anrually. Assuming a bond is issued in FY 97, the proceeds torn the toll increase are $133 rridlion, escalated. 
Total combineo revenues are divided 37.2/628 between Contra Costa and Alameda Cotrtty BART extensions, based on the counties' relasve populations. 
(6) Inducks $248 million (escalated) committed by CTC for 89/90 thru 97/97, and $29 million received prior to this period. 
A tots! of $79 million in Article XIX funds is provided for in the $3.5 billion pledged to eliminate the 1988 SW deficit. through FY 92/93. 
TP&D funds are used to finance the remaining $169 million. 
(7) The $245 million shown here represents Contra Costa's $178 million ('87$) Res. 1876 commitment, escalated to the rnidpoirtt of the projects construction. 
(8) BART extension costs are from the table attached to the BART General managers letter to IATC dated May 9, 1990. 
Caltrain costs are from Morris-Knudsen's 1989 estimate of a 2nd'Market Terminal. 
(9) The remaining costs on the CafTrain project are programmed from SCA I rail bond funds, which are divided among SF. SM, and SCL according to daily boardings. 
Daily boardings are based on projections of system-wide ridership for the 2nd and Market extension, and are split 28% SF. 38% SM, and 34% SCL 
(10) The amount required to match state funds will come from local sources required to fund the balance of the project 
(11) San Mateo funds for BART Eastbay extensions are equal to CTC funds allocated to BART SF0 in accordance with die regional agreement 








CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
This research project has provided a national perspective on the transit industry response to 
the Overmatch Initiative. In addition, through more detailed case investigations and interviews 
with transit officials, the research team has investigated the possible future applications of 
overmatch-type policies. The conclusions and observations from this research project will be 
divided into three major areas--Response to the Overmatch Initiative, Recommended UMTA 
Actions, and Policy Implementation Guidance. 
RESPONSE TO OVERMATCH INITIATIVE 
The research team found that, in general, there was a mixed opinion on the usefulness and  
appropriateness of the Overmatch Initiative.  In particular, numerous transit officials expressed 
concern about the "fairness" issue, that is, giving those communities who can afford more local 
support an unfair advantage over those less able to do so. This concern was especially strong 
among those officials who thought that local share might be more important in UMTA's 
decisions than need or cost effectiveness. Several officials suggested that overmatch might be 
an appropriate "tiebreaker" when transit needs have been satisfied and cost effectiveness 
determinations find that proposals are about even. Several agencies supported the Overmatch 
Initiative because they felt that it was a good way of stretching limited Federal dollars. 
The research project found several communities that had already begun overmatching. some 
at 100 percent local shares, even before the New Starts policy or the Overmatch Initiative had  
been announced. The major reason for this overmatch was to avoid what were considered to 
be excessive delays due to Federal process and oversight requirements. In Baltimore, for 
example, the Central Light Rail line is funded with 100 percent local funds, according to local 
officials to expedite its construction. In Los Angeles, several light rail lines are also funded 100 
percent locally so that they can be done "in this Century". It seems apparent, therefore, that 
several communities were already in the process of raising local funds to support transit capital 
investment. In the context of this phenomenon, there can be no definitive statement that the 
overmatch policy has had a significant impact on local transit financing decisions. 
In those cases where a local overmatch was provided, a surprising number of proposals were 
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initiated by private sector representatives. Although the number of such cases was quite small, 
especially when considered in light of the small number of agencies tnat responded to this survey 
question, the expectation was that almost all of the initiation woulc have been done by transit 
agencies. 
Very few transit agencies Set'  to be using a long-term financial model to consider total 
systems cost in project proposals. The uncertainties associated with the stability of revenue 
sources over time requires that a fairly sophisticated financial analysis should be conducted of 
an agency's ability to support its system and the new project in future years. In Los Angeles, 
for example, such a budget scenario analysis allowed officials to determine that several projects 
were not likely to be funded because existing local funding sources were not going to provide 
sufficient revenues. In Houston, a budget scenario analysis provided good information to 
METRO officials about their cash flow given the construction of different transit proposals. 
Given that the overmatch policy encourages a greater local match, becomes important that a 
greater emphasis be placed in the development of realistic financial scenarios. This is especially 
true if private sector funding is expected in support of a project, w'cre that funding is predicated 
on assessments or some other mechanism that depends on market forces. 
An analysis of the Section 15 data base showed no indication tit the New Starts overmatch  
criterion had any measurable impact on local financing of transit. This conclusion, although it 
supports the results from the rest of the research project, should be treated with some caution. 
In particular, it was somewhat difficult to identify private sources of funding in the Section 15 
data base. In addition, the year-to-year variation in revenue sources was rather substantial, 
leading one to suspect that the data might not be that reliable for the purposes of this research 
project. 
Only one region, the Bay Area, seemed to be approaching the C v. -,rmatch Initiative from a 
regional or programmatic perspective. The Bay Area transit overmatch strategy is based on an 
extensive, region-wide study of what transit capital improvements are needed in the future. 
Some of the facilities are to be funded with 100 percent local funds, and others are expected to 
have varying levels of Federal participation. Although somewhat unique in its approach, the 
systems perspective in transit capital planning seems to make a stronger case for Federal 
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investment in a region, rather than in a specific facility. 
Several transit officials commented that the requirement for cash overmatch contributions  
was extremely limiting.  Such a requirement was especially constraining when dealing with 
private sector contributions. The major means of such contributions in the past has been land 
donations and or leasing arrangements. Many transit officials stated that it is very difficult to 
convince private developers and businessmen to contribute funding for a particular project. As 
long as there is a cash requirement, private sector contributions will not likely play a major role 
in overmatch contributions. Outside of the private sector issue, numerous transit officials 
thought that "in-kind" services should be allowed as part of an overmatch given that it is a cost 
associated with a project. 
A large percentage of the survey respondents stated that they do not know how to initiate 
an overmatch request. or for that matter how to raise the additional funds at the local level. 
There was a fair amount of interest in the overmatch concept and how transit agencies could use 
it to raise additional local funds. This finding suggests that additional information on the 
Initiative and further research on innovative local funding sources would be well received by the 
industry. 
There was no perceived difference in the overmatch policy between the three UMTA  
program Tiers. Although a small number of transit officials did know the different overmatch 
concepts associated with each of the three UMTA program categories, the vast majority of the 
survey respondents did not know that the Overmatch Initiative applied to all three. Most all 
respondents thought the Initiative was coley aimed at new starts. 
There is no industry agreement on whether the Overmatch Initiative is a good or bad idea.  
Many survey respondents said that no UMTA decisions have been made on the basis of 
overmatch, so that it was too soon to determine the policy's appropriateness. Others were 
vehemently opposed to any policy that required a greater local match. And others felt that the 
concept was quite good. 
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RECOMMENDED UMTA ACTIONS 
Perhaps the most important recommendation from this research project deals with future use 
of the overmatch concept in L and other knsportation progn The scant literature t 
has addressed this type of intergovernmental program management seems fairly clear on the 
benefits (from a national perspective) of allowir , local applicants to propose a greater local 
share for specific proposals. Not only does this allow Federal funds to be leveraged against 
more projects, it encourages communities to provide a closer representation of what they are 
willing to pay for a service. It also forces a consensus at the local level that this proposal is 
something the community should be doing. 
However, an overmatch concept is only likely to work if there are substantial incentives to 
encourage local officials to contribute additional funding. There does not seem to be any 
evidence that UMTA has been significantly influenced in its project decisions by the existence 
of overmatch. The Overmatch Initiative does allow greater flexibilit in program management, 
but generally the survey respondents did not feel that overmatch has become an important 
consideration in UMTA decisions. One way of dealing with this is to change the focus of the 
Overmatch Initiative away from the individual project basis to the regional, programmatic  
;!,o-rspective. In many cases, ,‘k of the most controversial positions taken be UMTA has t :gin 
the one-corridor-at-a-time approach to Federal funding. Although a systems planning component 
is incorporated into this approach, some argue that the resulting process severely limits an 
agency's ability to take a system's perspective in its planning for a community's transit future. 
The Bay Area strategy, which took a long time to develop and to secure local funding sources, 
seems to allow a systems perspective while at the same time developing an overall funding 
strategy for the region. It also forces the local agencies to adopt a long-range financial pla:„'. ing 
perspective in their formal planning ei , rts. Allowing communities to get away from a corridor-
by-corridor analysis might be a good incentive to local officials in seriously considering the 
Overmatch Initiative. 
UMTA should also take steps to require a long-range, financial planning process in  
connection with UMTA projects. This includes not only the UMTA project, but also the 
Undertaking and, in some cases, the entire financial capability -f the agency. It is not 
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unreasonable to expect that Federal funds will be spent contingent on the existence of an 
assessment of the local agency's ability to operate the facility and other services in the region. 
This requirement could be made procedural, or be provided through technical guidance. Case 
studies of successful financial forecasting (such as Los Angeles and Houston, in this research) 
could be used to develop an industry-wide approach to such forecasting. The Federal interest 
in making sure an investment will meet national needs goes beyond the narrowly defined project 
under consideration. 
There is a perception that the Overmatch Initiative is unfair to those communities that are 
unable to afford additional local funds, and thus, as many survey respondents stated, "the rich 
get richer". This equity issue is a serious one and needs to be dealt with. The overmatch 
criterion in UMTA evaluation is clearly an important one, but either it should receive less  
weight than other criteria (which it might have already). or applicants should be classified in  
some manner by their ability to pay.  In the latter case, some index could be developed for each 
applicant community which examines economic growth, tax base, future population/employment 
figures, etc., and if it is determined that a community is in a strong growth or healthy climate, 
the overmatch criterion will be given greater consideration. Those communities that fit into the 
other category would not have overmatch as a criterion in the funding decision. Another way 
of accomplishing this objective is to lower the current Federal matching ratio from 80-20 to 60-
40 (or even 50-50) and provide extra Federal grants to those communities showing need or 
which meet some national criterion (for example, air quality improvement).  
Many respondents identified the cash requirement as unnecessarily stringent. This is 
apparently so especially in the case of encouraging private sector contributions. A list of 
acceptable "in-kind" services or donations should be incorporated into the Overmatch Policy. 
These in-kind donations should clearly relate to a reduction in Federal costs and not be services 
or facility construction that would have been provided by the local agency. 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE 
It was clear from the survey results and from the case investigations that many transit 
officials did not know much about the Overmatch Initiative. Although several did have the 
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"Dear Colleague" letter from 	UMTA Administrator, most had expected to receive further 
information on what the Initiative consisted of, and what steps were necessary to participate in 
the program. In particular, several transit officials commented that the UMTA regional offices 
were not able to provide much further information that what was available in the letter. This 
lack of information, perhaps more than anything else, has probably beem an important reason 
for limited local response to the Initiative. If UMTA is serious about the Overmatch concept, 
it seems clear that technical guidance should be issued, information disseminated on successful 
overmatch efforts, and clear indications given on how important overmatch is in the UMTA  
decision-making process. A policy which relies on incentives to encourage a change in local 
behavior needs to make clear what these incentives are. 
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Appendix A—Overmatch Survey 
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OVERMATCH INITIATIVE SURVEY 
A. 	CAPITAL PROJECTS 
1. Has your agency initiated or continued implementing any capital projects/ 
undertakings since UMTA's Overmatch Initiative of 1984? If yes, please 
complete the remaining parts of this survey. If no, please proceed to question 
6. If you need to use additional sheets to complete the questionnaire, please 
do so. 
Yes 	 No 	 
2. Please identify these projects below. 
TITLE/NAlvIE 	PROJECT STAGE 	 EST. PROJECI' COST 
(Planning, AA/DEIS, Pre. Eng'g, etc.) 	(1984-1990) 
Total 	  
Federal 	 
Local 
Total 	  
Federal 
Local 
Total 	  
Federal ,o 
Local 	 07 
1 
" B. 	FUNDING 
3. 	What are the sources of the local share for each project listed in question 2 




Geopolitical Level? 	Form of 	Source(s) 






4. 	a) If any portion of the local share is being provided (or yau anticipate will 
be provided) by non-governmental (e.g., private sector) entities, please 
describe the source and amount. 
b) Was this offer initiated by the non-governmental groups or was the 
support solicited by the transit agency or facilitated by other means such 
as zoning? 
2 
5. To what extent did you consider the full costs of total system implementation 
when deciding to apply for federal money for initial projects? 
C. PERSPECTIVES ON THE OVERMATCH POLICY 
6. If you are providing more local share than is required (i.e., an overmatch), 
why are you doing so? 
7. Based on what you have received or heard about UMTA's Overmatch 
Initiative, how would you describe what this policy is. Do you perceive any 
difference in the Overmatch incentives if one is considering bus or bus-related 
projects versus new starts versus rail modernization? 
8. What, in general, is your assessment of the Overmatch Policy? 
9. Have you generated activity as a result of the Overmatch Policy or has your 
agency generally adopted such a policy all along? 
10. 	What changes in the Overmatch policy would you recommend? 
3 
11. Do you think the Overmatch policy is equitable? Why or why not? 
12. Do you think the Overmatch policy is efficient? Why or why not? 
13. What kind of incentive can be added to encourage use of the Overmatch 
Initiative? 
14. What problems have you encountered in implementing the Overmatch policy? 
15. Please attach any documents/publications which would be of assistance to us 
in understanding your responses. 
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